USA Power v. Pacificorp : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2008
USA Power v. Pacificorp : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
P. Bruce Badger; Fabian & Clendenin; Thomas R. Karrenberg; Stephen P. Horvat; Anderson &
Karrenberg; Attorneys for Appellees.
Peggy A. Tomsic; Eric K. Schnibbe; J. Ryan Connelly; Tomsic & Peck; Attorney for Appellants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, USA Power v. Pacificorp, No. 20080176.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2788
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
USA POWER LLC, USA POWER
PARTNERS, L.L.C., and SPRING
CANYON ENERGY, LLC,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
PACIFICORP, JODY L. WILLIAMS and
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP,
Defendants and Appellees.
Supreme Court Case No. 
20080176-SC
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS USA POWER, LLC, 
USA POWER PARTNERS, L.L.C., AND SPRING CANYON ENERGY, LLC
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY
P. Bruce Badger
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State Street, 12th Floor
P. O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah  84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
PACIFICORP
Thomas R. Karrenberg
Stephen P. Horvat
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah  84101
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
JODY L. WILLIAMS and HOLME,
ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP
Peggy A. Tomsic (3879)
Eric K. Schnibbe (8463)
J. Ryan Connelly (11546)
TOMSIC & PECK LLC
136 East South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah  84111
Telephone:  (801) 532-1995
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
USA POWER LLC, USA POWER
PARTNERS, L.L.C., and SPRING
CANYON ENERGY, LLC

iTABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, PRESERVATION,
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CITATION TO DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
I. USA Power’s Development of its Spring Canyon Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A. USA Power’s Decision to Develop a Power Project in Mona, Utah . . . . . . . 7
B. USA Power’s Creation of Basic Design, Configuration and Resource
Requirements for Spring Canyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
C. USA Power’s Determination the Spring Canyon Project Would Be
Economically Feasible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
D. Acquisition of Assets for Spring Canyon Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
E. USA Power’s Spring Canyon Project Was Confidential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
II. Panda Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
III. USA Power Hires Williams as its Attorney to Serve on its 
Development Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
IV. USA Power and Williams/HRO’s Marketing of the 
Spring Canyon Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
V. PacifiCorp Contacts USA Power about Purchasing Spring Canyon and 
Obtains USA Power’s Confidential Information Pursuant to a 
Confidentiality Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
ii
VI. PacifiCorp Decides to Build Its Own Power Plant in Mona, And 
Authorizes the Purchase of Spring Canyon for that Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
VII. PacifiCorp Agrees to Purchase Spring Canyon, Abruptly Reneges on its
Agreement,  Announces the Issuance of an RFP, and PacifiCorp’s 
Reasons for Doing So . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
VIII. Williams/HRO’s Adverse Representation of PacifiCorp, Use and 
Disclosure of USA Power’s Confidential Information and Crucial Role in
Obtaining Firm Water Supply for Currant Creek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
IX. PacifiCorp’s Preparation and Submission of a Competing RFP Bid in 
an Unrealistic Time Frame and Use of USA Power’s Confidential 
Information to Win the RFP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
X. PacifiCorp Awards Itself the Contract, Spring Canyon Is Ranked 
Second, and There Is No Room for Another Plant in Mona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
XI. USA Power Discovers Williams/HRO’s Secret Representation of 
PacifiCorp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
XII. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment and the District 
Court Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
I. THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE LEGAL
STANDARDS GOVERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A. The District Court Erroneously Applied Rule 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
B. The District Court Erroneously Weighed Evidence and Failed to Draw
Reasonable Inferences in USA Power’s Favor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
iii
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT’S 
GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON USA POWER’S TRADE
SECRET AND BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS BECAUSE THE
DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING USA POWER’S CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION WAS NOT A TRADE SECRET USED BY PACIFICORP53
A. The District Court Erred in Ruling USA Power Failed to Establish 
the Existence of a Trade Secret Because USA Power Presented 
Evidence of its Trade Secret on This Fact Intensive Issue and The
District Court Focused Exclusively on Whether Each Individual
Constituent Element, Rather Than the Compilation, Was Known or
Generally Ascertainable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
B. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment When 
USA Power Presented Sufficient Evidence From Which a Jury 
Could Infer the Fact of Misappropriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
C. Summary Judgment on USA Power’s Claim for Breach of Contract Was
in Error Because USA Power Presented Evidence That PacifiCorp
Breached the Confidentiality Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
III. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE GRANT OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE FIDUCIARY
DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT
IGNORED BOTH DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF
WILLIAMS/HRO’S DISCLOSURE AND/OR USE OF USA POWER’S
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND ESTABLISHED AN
ERRONEOUS RULE OF LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A. USA Power Presented Direct Evidence That Williams/HRO Disclosed 
And Used USA Power’s Confidential Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
B. The District Court Applied An Erroneous Rule Of Law Requiring An
Injured Client To Show Actual Evidence Of Disclosure and Use of Its
Confidential Information Even Where There Was Circumstantial
Evidence Of Use And Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
iv
C. The District Court Erred in Rejecting Persuasive Case Law  That 
Would Permit a Jury to Infer Use and/or Disclosure of Confidential
Information Where the Lawyer Engages in Simultaneous Adverse
Representation Such As Occurred in this Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
USA POWER’S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY 
OF LOYALTY DUE TO LACK OF CAUSATION BECAUSE USA 
POWER PRESENTED EVIDENCE THAT WILLIAMS/HRO’S 
BREACH CAUSED USA POWER TO LOSE THE SALE OF SPRING
CANYON AND THE RFP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
vTABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Alfieri v. Alfieri, 733 P.2d 4 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, 358 N.E.2d 804 (Mass. 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20 (Utah 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d 1013 (Wyo. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73, 74
Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, 156 P.3d 175 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Chrysler Corp. v. Carey, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1033-34 (E.D. Mo. 1998) . . . . . . . . . 73, 74
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288 (D. Del. 1985) . . . . . . . 59
Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Quest Software Inc., 
333 F. Supp. 2d 688 (N.D. Ill. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp., 479 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D.D.C. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. Co. v. 51-SPR-L.L.C., 2008 UT 28, 183 P.3d 248 . . 46-50, 52
Fairview Hosp. & Health Care Servs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
535 N.W.2d 337 (Minn. 1995) (en banc) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49, 52
Fannen v. Lehi City, 2005 UT App 301, 2005 WL 1530517 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 
505 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (D. Utah 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53, 56
Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, 77 P.3d 339 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Hammerton, Inc. v. Heisterman, No. 2:06-CV-00806 TS, 2008 WL 2004327 . . . . . 61, 63
Harvey Barnett, Inc. v. Shilder, 338 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56, 59
Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67 (3d Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72, 74
vi
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, 37 P.3d 1130 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) . . . 72, 74, 75
Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1978) . . . . . . . . 56
Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2003 . . . . . . 56
Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 
285 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Madison v. Deseret Livestock Co., 574 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61, 63
Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 
28 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59, 63
Scott v. HK Contractors, 2008 UT App 370 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Shaw Res. Ltd., L.L.C. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 
2006 UT App 313, 142 P.3d 560 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 52, 67, 69, 70, 73
Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, 70 P.3d 904 . . . . . . . . 6, 44
Sokol Crystal Prods., Inc. v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 
15 F.3d 1427 (7th Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Stratienko v. Cordis Corp., 429 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15, 179 P.3d 786 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Wasatch Oil & Gas, L.L.C. v. Reott, 2007 UT App 223, 163 P.3d 713 . . . . . . . . . . 46-49
vii
Wayment v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 2005 Utah 25, 116 P.3d 271 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 5, 53, 56, 59, 61
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
RULES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 39-40, 43-46
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72, 74
OTHER AUTHORITIES
10A Charles A. Wright, et al., Fed. Practice & Proc. § 2725 (3d ed. Westlaw 2008) . . . 49
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 60 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 59 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
  Except where indicated, Plaintiffs/Appellants USA Power LLC, USA Power Partners,1
L.L.C., and Spring Canyon Energy, LLC are collectively referred to as “USA Power.”
1
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) because this
is a civil appeal not within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, PRESERVATION, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Did the district court err in ruling no genuine issues of material fact
existed for USA Power’s  seven claims for relief because PacifiCorp’s statements of material1
fact were “undisputed,” when:
a. The district court deemed the vast majority of PacifiCorp’s statements of
material fact admitted based on USA Power’s purported failure to comply with Rule 7 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, despite the fact USA Power fully complied with Rule 7 by
restating PacifiCorp’s facts verbatim, explaining the grounds for USA Power’s dispute of
those facts or the inferences PacifiCorp sought drawn in its favor based on those facts, and
providing supporting record citations to admissible evidence for such explanation;
b. The district court failed to draw all reasonable inferences from disputed and
undisputed facts in favor of USA Power, despite that those facts were susceptible to two
equally reasonable inferences and the reasonableness of the inference in USA Power’s favor
was supported by record citation to admissible evidence; and
c. The district court found USA Power’s evidence speculative – that is, not
credible – despite the fact that, on summary judgment, the district court was precluded from
weighing the evidence, making credibility determinations, and disregarding USA Power’s
2admissible evidence?  (R5966, 5913-65, 5976 at n.13, 8167 at 200-01)
Issue No. 2:  Did the district court err in ruling USA Power’s trade secret and breach
of the Confidentiality Agreement claims failed, as a matter of law, on the grounds:
a. USA Power’s trade secret claim failed because it did not produce evidence that
could establish at trial the existence of a trade secret, when:  (1) the existence of a trade
secret is a fact-intensive issue properly determined by a jury, (2) USA Power presented
evidence that its “Spring Canyon” electrical generation power plant project was a unique and
undisclosed combination of elements, which had independent economic value derived from
not being readily ascertainable by proper means, and (3) the district court instead considered
only whether each individual, constituent element of that combination was a secret, or readily
ascertainable, and did not consider whether the combination of elements could be ascertained
by proper means in the specific time constraints involved in the bidding process; and
b. USA Power’s trade secret claim failed because it did not demonstrate evidence
of misappropriation sufficient to withstand summary judgment, when USA Power presented
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation by PacifiCorp and, in the absence of governing
Utah case law, under persuasive authority, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to withstand
summary judgment?  (R5968-89, 5913-64)
c. USA Power’s claim for breach of the Confidentiality Agreement failed because
it did not provide evidence PacifiCorp used its confidential information, when USA Power
presented circumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer PacifiCorp used
USA Power’s confidential information to develop Current Creek, including that PacifiCorp
could not, in the limited time available, have sited Current Creek at Mona, Utah as a dry-
  Except where indicated, Defendants/Appellees Jody L. Williams and Holme, Roberts &2
Owen, LLP are collectively referred to as “Williams/HRO.”
3
cooled, combined-cycle project.  (R5913-64, 5989-91)
Issue No. 3:  Did the district court err in ruling USA Power’s claim against
Williams/HRO  for breach of their fiduciary duty of confidentiality failed, as a matter of law2
on the grounds:
a. USA Power failed to present “actual” evidence Williams/HRO disclosed USA
Power’s confidential information, when USA Power presented direct evidence they disclosed
and used USA Power’s confidential information for PacifiCorp’s benefit; 
b. Shaw Res. Ltd., L.L.C. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 2006 UT App 313,
¶ 29, 142 P.3d 560, barred USA Power from establishing use or disclosure by circumstantial
evidence, when that decision does not preclude use of circumstantial evidence and USA
Power presented circumstantial evidence Williams/HRO disclosed and used USA Power’s
confidential information for PacifiCorp’s benefit; and 
c. Utah law would not recognize the rule persuasively adopted in other states that
an attorney’s representation of directly adverse parties may alone support an inference, which
may be drawn by the fact finder, that information was used or disclosed by the attorney, even
though such a rule is necessary due to the inherent difficulty of obtaining direct evidence of
disclosure and to further the policy goal of not shielding attorneys from the legal
consequences of their breaches of fiduciary duty?  (R3930-88, 8167 at 29-34, 39-42)
Issue No. 4: Did the district court err in ruling USA Power’s breach of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty claim failed, as a matter of law, due to a lack of evidence establishing the
4element of causation, when (1) USA Power presented evidence it reached an agreement with
PacifiCorp in March 2003 for PacifiCorp to purchase the Spring Canyon project  and, but for
Williams/HRO’s breach by representing PacifiCorp, there is a reasonable likelihood that sale
would have closed; (2) USA Power presented evidence its Spring Canyon project was the
only viable project that could meet PacifiCorp’s power need, as stated in the 2003 RFP, in
the necessary time frame and, but for Williams/HRO’s breach by representing PacifiCorp as
USA Power’s competitor and using for PacifiCorp’s benefit their unique knowledge gained
in representing USA Power, there is a reasonable likelihood PacifiCorp could not have
developed a viable, competing project in time to award itself, rather than USA Power, the
contract; and when (3) the district court’s reasoning that USA Power could not show
causation, as a matter of law, if other qualified lawyers in the area might have provided the
services Williams/HRO provided in breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty, is bad public
policy because it effectively immunizes lawyers from civil liability for damages resulting
from conflicting representation and encourages lawyers to breach their duty of loyalty to
existing clients?  (R6083-98, 6121-29, 8167 at 89-99)
Standard of Review:  This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment
for correctness, granting no deference to the district court’s legal conclusions, and determines
only whether the district court erred in applying the governing law and whether the district
court correctly held there were no disputed issues of material fact.  Wayment v. Clear
Channel Broad., Inc., 2005 Utah 25, ¶ 15, 116 P.3d 271 (alteration in original).  Further, this
Court reviews the ruling regarding whether a party has failed to comply with the
requirements of a Rule of Civil Procedure for correctness, affording no particular deference
5to the district court’s determination.  Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990). 
CITATION TO DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The rules and statutes determinative of this appeal are set out verbatim in the attached
Addendum at Tabs 1-3, respectively:  (1) Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c); (2) Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(A) & (B); and (3) Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2 (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
USA Power filed an action against their lawyers, Williams/HRO, in the Third District
Court for the State of Utah on February 18, 2005, alleging they breached their fiduciary
duties of loyalty and confidentiality by simultaneously and adversely representing PacifiCorp
on a competing electric power project in Mona, Utah, and disclosing and/or using USA
Power’s confidential information for PacifiCorp’s benefit.  (R1-21)  On October 26, 2005,
USA Power filed a Second Amended Complaint joining PacifiCorp as a defendant, alleging
PacifiCorp:  (1) violated the Uniform Trade Secrets Act by misappropriating USA Power’s
trade secret regarding USA Power’s power project in Mona; (2) breached a confidentiality
agreement with USA Power regarding their trade secret; (3) breached its implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing; (4) intentionally interfered with USA Power’s existing
contractual relations with Williams/HRO; and (5) was unjustly enriched.  (R759-87)
Between January 30 and April 30, 2007, PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO moved for
summary judgment on all USA Power’s claims, which USA Power opposed.  (R1690D-Aa,
1698A-1717, 4086-127, 4392-94, 8555-98; 3878-98, 3927-89, 6004-130, 5904-95)  After
oral argument, the district court, on October 15, 2007, issued a Memorandum Decision and,
on October 24, 2007, Orders granting PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO’s motions for summary
  The district court’s Memorandum Decision and Orders are in the attached Addendum at3
Tabs 4 through 6.  All other record papers cited are contained in the accompanying continued
Addendum, Volumes I through V, by record page number.
   The district court did not grant summary judgment on a disgorgement remedy under USA4
Power’s breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty claim against Williams/HRO, but that remedy
was later resolved rendering the summary judgment rulings final.  (R8095-111)
  USA Power, the non-movant below, states the following, viewing facts and reasonable5
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to its claims, just as this Court views
them.  Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, ¶ 2, 70 P.3d 904.
  A power project is generally understood in the industry as the collection of assets necessary6
to construct an economically viable plant; it does not include the actual construction and
operation of a plant.  (R3721)
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judgment.   (R7599-624, 7625-32)  USA Power timely appealed the summary judgment3
rulings.   (R8147-48)4
STATEMENT OF FACTS5
I. USA Power’s Development of its Spring Canyon Project
USA Power LLC was formed in 1996, under a previous name, for the purpose of
locating, acquiring and developing electric power generation sites, i.e., developing power
projects.   (R1865-80)  Development of a power project is “a complex, costly and time-6
consuming undertaking,” and a natural gas fueled project “generally require[s] anywhere
from eighteen to twenty-four months to develop from site selection to the point of initial
construction.”  (R3721)  In this process, a developer, such as USA Power, must engage in
the time consuming and difficult tasks of site analysis and acquisition; studies, modeling and
evaluations of plant design and configuration; obtaining necessary permits and approvals;
and preparing financial proformas.  (Id.)  The creation, conclusions and combination of such
materials “are considered confidential and proprietary in the power industry because of the
competitive edge it gives the developer.”  (R3723) 
  At all times relevant to these proceedings, Ted Banasiewicz (“Ted”), Lois Banasiewicz7
(“Lois”), and David Graeber (“David”) were the three principals of USA Power, who were
engaged in the business of developing power projects.  (R1951-52, 6062)  The plaintiffs’
corporate structure is not material to review of the district court’s disposition, except that
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of USA Power Partners, L.L.C.,
that was formed in February 2002 for the purpose of holding assets relative to the Spring
Canyon project being developed in Mona, Utah.  (R2851-53, 10000-04)
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A. USA Power’s Decision to Develop a Power Project in Mona, Utah
USA Power spent years researching and evaluating different site locations, particularly
in the West, to determine where to develop a power project. (R1962-63)  Its methodology for
site selection included, first, evaluating electrical transmission systems in place, assessing
whether sites would have access to fuel (such as natural gas) and water (for cooling), and
assessing whether a local community would be receptive to a power plant.  (R1963-64)
After considering a number of locations, USA Power, in early 2001, decided to
develop a power project in Utah.   (R2903-05, 1965-66)  USA Power ultimately focused on7
Utah because its principals Ted, Lois, and David identified a favorable power market due to
Utah’s increasing population and the comparatively easier regulatory regime of the western
United States.  (R1955-56, 1960-61)  In addition, the state electricity provider had not taken
advantage of the situation:  “PacifiCorp had done a . . . lousy job of developing . . .
generation resources in the State of Utah.”  (R1956)  Further, there were other geographic
advantages:  a power plant in Utah could sell power to that market or to other adjoining
markets, such as California, where prices would be higher, (R1956-57) and it could take
advantage of natural gas which was cheaper in the Rocky Mountain area.  (R1961-62) 
Finally, an electrical transmission substation (also referred to as a “switching station”) owned
by PacifiCorp Transmission was located in Mona, Utah, which was accessible from the
8different sites USA Power was considering.  (R2011-13, 9983, 10130-32, 10140)
USA Power spent months researching and consulting with their Utah lawyer, Williams
(as discussed below), to determine which Utah site it was considering would be best.
(R1961-64)  In addition to an initial visit to potential Utah sites in 1998, Ted, Lois, and Dave,
beginning in 2001, made regular visits to Utah to select and ultimately develop a site.
(R1876, 1965-66)  They met with local officials, including those of Juab County, to gauge
whether those officials and communities would be receptive to a power plant.  (R1967-68)
USA Power ultimately decided Mona, Utah was the most desirable site.   (R2903-07,
1966-72, 1981-83)   USA Power named the development in Mona the Spring Canyon project.
Ted, in developing the Spring Canyon project, made over twenty visits to Mona.  (R1978)
 B. USA Power’s Creation of Basic Design, Configuration and Resource
Requirements for Spring Canyon
USA Power had a multitude of potential plant designs from which to choose in
developing the Spring Canyon project.  For example, USA Power had to determine the size
– i.e., generation capacity for the plant – for the most efficient plant (highest generation
capacity by cost of a single facility) that would serve the specific needs of the market for
which it was targeted, such as an ability to provide power during peak demand periods vs.
an ability to provide around-the-clock sustained “base load” power.  (R2022)  It had to
choose from a variety of fuel options, including coal or natural gas.  (R2020-21)  Once a fuel
source was chosen, USA Power had to choose the operating components.  With a gas-fired
plant, there are “lots of manufacturers of gas turbines and each of those manufacturers have
several, various models of gas turbines . . . [that] operate differently and operate for different
  The differences between wet and dry cooling are discussed below.8
  In a gas-fired plant, natural gas is taken into a combustion turbine and combined with air.9
When ignited, this combination expands and turns an electrical generator that, in turn,
produces electricity.  (R2025-27)  If the plant is limited to such a process, it is referred to as
a “simple-cycle” plant.  (R2027-28)
A combined-cycle plant is far more complicated than a simple cycle plant.  (R2027)
It incorporates combustion turbine(s), but uses the 1,000 degree exhaust from that
combustion to create additional generation capacity.  This is done through a heat recovery
steam generator, which converts incoming water into steam, using the pressure from that
expansion to turn a steam-turbine connected to another generator.  (R2026-27)  By adding
a steam cycle, a combined-cycle plant requires much more rotating equipment, systems to
handle the flow of water, and emission sources that are not present with a simple-cycle
design.  (R2027-28)
  A “1x1” design matches a single steam turbine for each gas turbine whereas in a “2x1”10
design, two gas turbines are connected to a single steam turbine.  (R10135)
  The Spring Canyon project planned for a maximum capacity of 539 MW (R3733, 10127),11
but the actual output varies with temperature.  (R10135-37)  For convenience, the capacity
has been referred to as 550 MW.
  USA Power determined a 550 MW capacity was optimal for at least two reasons.  A 55012
MW facility would require the same number of individuals to operate as a 250 MW facility
and, therefore, the larger facility would be more economically efficient.  (R2023)  Also, a
capacity larger than 550 MW was not feasible due to the difficulty in obtaining an air permit
for a larger plant at that specific location based on the geological characteristics and its
proximity to Salt Lake, a non-attainment area.  (R2023-24, 2061-63)
  USA Power determined that Spring Canyon would be designed as a gas fueled plant13
because a coal fueled plant would create air permit problems due to the site’s location near
Salt Lake and Provo.  (R2035-36, 2061-63)  There were two primary sources of natural gas
9
functions. ”  (R2021-22, 2033)  USA Power also had to determine whether the plant would
be designed as a wet or dry cooled plant.   (R2051-52)  Additional considerations were8
whether the plant would be combined or simple cycle,  whether it would be a “2x1” or “1x1”9
configuration  and whether the plant would use zero discharge technology.  (R2028, 2055,10
2197-2200)
USA Power designed and configured the Spring Canyon project, on a Mona site-
specific basis, as an approximate 550  megawatt (“MW”),  air (not water) cooled, gas-11 12
fired,  combined cycle plant  in a 2x1 configuration with 7FA GE turbines,  duct firing,13 14 15 16
in the area from a Kern River or a Questar pipeline.  (R2037)  USA Power evaluated the
topography relative to both pipelines and other pertinent characteristics, such as possible
interconnection points and pathways, and conducted discussions with the gas suppliers and
Nephi city officials.  (R2037-40)  After engaging in “a long analysis of a variety of different
ways of moving gas,” USA Power eventually determined to proceed with Questar as its
supplier, connecting to Questar’s “Mainline 104” pipeline.  (Id.)
  USA Power chose a combined-cycle design, rather than a simple-cycle design, because14
it is more efficient, could be operated more often, and would provide generation capacity for
a base load, and not just peaking capacity.  (R2029-30)  Simple-cycle plants are relatively
easy to design and quick to build, but are inefficient and operated to provide “peaking”
capacity – i.e., electricity during those times of day when there is higher demand by
electricity users. (R2027-30)
  There were many manufacturers of possible gas turbines and each had multiple models15
from which to choose.  (R2033)  USA Power determined to use two General Electric, model
Frame 7FA gas turbines based on Utah’s unique topography and the need for it to emit fewer
pollutants since it would frequently be started and stopped.  (R2022, 2034-35)
  USA Power chose to include duct firing, which uses ignited natural gas to quickly increase16
the temperature of the gas turbine exhaust to create more steam that, in turn, increases
electrical output from the steam turbines almost instantaneously.  (R2031)  Of the many
possible types of duct burners available in the industry, USA Power opted for the largest size
possible without requiring one to be custom designed.  (R2032)
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and zero water discharge technology.  USA Power spent almost two years performing the
tests, evaluations and modeling to determine the design and configuration of the project.
(R2022, 2036, 2055-56, 2299-2303)
In reaching its decision as to the specific design of the Spring Canyon project, USA
Power commissioned and engaged in detailed studies that specifically evaluated the
feasibility of siting a power plant in Mona.  First, USA Power commissioned an analysis
from Waldron Engineering (“Waldron”) regarding whether a combined-cycle design should
be a 1x1 or 2x1 design.  (R10135-37)  The analysis explained and compared the relative
costs, advantages and disadvantages.  (R10135-36)  Further, the analysis included
performance data for the 2x1 configuration based upon various ambient temperatures at an
elevation of 5100 feet above sea level (Mona’s approximate elevation).  (R10137)  In
  In a combined-cycle plant, after steam has been used to turn a steam turbine, the steam17
needs to be cooled so that it condenses into liquid form and then recycles back to the gas
turbine exhaust to repeat the steam-generation process.  (R2050, 3706)
  In a wet cooling system, water is used to absorb the heat through vaporization into the18
surrounding air.  (R2050, 3704)  Virtually all steam-electric plants built before 1990 used wet
cooling systems.  (R3706)
  Dry cooling technology carries the steam through a condenser on which a fan blows air19
that transfers the heat from the steam into the ambient air without loss of water through
evaporation.  (R2050, 3704, 8167 at 139-40)  After 1990, dry cooling technology was
developed but was unusual for a 550 MW power plant operating at the altitude of the Mona
site.  (R3705-06, generally, 4666-79)
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particular, the performance data showed that, by using a duct burner with a chiller, the 2x1
configuration could still maintain output at 516.2 MW at Mona’s elevation during summer
temperatures of 100 degrees.  (R10137)  Waldron also provided the technical engineering
and conceptual designs of the power plant.  (R1992, 10222-27)
USA Power and Waldron also engaged in lengthy, site-specific analyses as to the
appropriate cooling technology  to use in a plant at Mona which had an elevation of 510017
feet and an arid climate with summer daytime temperatures that average above 90 degrees.
(R10260, 2050-55, 9244, 10275-80)  The two types of cooling technology available – wet
cooling  and dry cooling (also known as air cooling)  – each had characteristics that18 19
significantly impacted the cost and performance of a plant operating at the altitude and
ambient air temperatures of Mona, necessitating the extensive analysis of the two systems.
Wet cooling required a significantly lower capital investment in the equipment but required
ten times the water of dry cooled technology.  (R2154-55, 5155-56)  The time needed to
acquire sufficient water rights would significantly delay such development and increase the
cost of the project due to the scarcity of water in Mona.  (R2051-53)  Dry cooling, however,
could cost tens of millions of dollars more in capital investment for the equipment, but the
  An energy penalty is the decline in electrical generating output resulting from a cooling20
system’s inability to maintain the desired steam condensate temperature for steam turbine
generator performance.  (R3704-05)  The energy penalty resulting from dry cooling increases
with altitude.  (R5155-56, 4669)
  “[G]as turbine performance varies with altitude as well as ambient temperature” due to21
the density of the air.  (R4666, 4670, 6748)  Indeed, gas turbines operate differently at Salt
Lake’s elevation than they do at sea level.  The evaluation of a gas turbine’s performance is
“a site-specific evaluation which is not available to the public.”  (R2103)
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cost of and time to acquire necessary water rights would be significantly less, enabling the
development to be completed in a shorter time period.  (R2051-53, 3706, 5155-56)
The decision whether to use dry cooling at a high altitude and ambient temperature site,
such as Mona, requires intense analysis due to the “energy penalties” associated with dry
cooling.   “[T]he magnitude of this energy penalty is an important consideration in the20
selection and design of a cooling system for a new power plant, especially . . . at a site with
high summertime temperatures.”   (R3705)  Moreover, using a dry-cooling system is more
complicated and “minor changes in the size of the dry cooling system can produce major
changes in the power plant economics based on capital, operating and energy penalty costs.”
(R3706)  “[M]eaningful energy penalty estimates are an essential element in economically
optimizing and comparing possible cooling system design alternatives.”  (R3706)  “Without
this type of site specific analysis, the economic viability normally presented in the pro forma
of a proposed plant project would be incomplete.”  (Id.) 
For these reasons, USA Power for over a year analyzed the appropriate cooling options
in connection with possible gas turbines  and available configurations.  (R4668-69)  USA21
Power analyzed, on a site-specific basis, both dry and wet cooling, the potential costs with
  Waldron also specifically evaluated the potential water usage for a plant by modeling22
“water tables” which demonstrated the amount of water that would be annually utilized either
by a dry-cooled or a wet-cooled plant of the size of Spring Canyon and the means of
discharging its effluent.  This testing was particularly critical for a large industrial project in
a county with minimal water.  (R1978-79, 3699-3714, 4676-78, 10391-403)
  In addition to these efforts, USA Power hired a consultant team named ABB, which23
performed a Fatal Flaw Analysis assessing the capacity of the existing substation in Mona.
(R1970) That analysis was specific to USA Power’s planned 550 MW plant in Mona,
connected to the Mona substation, and a planned in-service date by the end of 2003.
(R10203-10221)
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each and the projected output and calculation of energy penalties.   The energy penalties22
were done with site-specific calculations in 2001 and 2002 by Ray Racine, Waldron’s lead
engineer.  Racine’s calculations determined that a dry cooled plant with Spring Canyon’s
configuration could nearly match wet-cooled performance even on the hottest days at Mona.
(R5155-56; 2153-59, 4667, 4669-70)  Those calculations and related information
demonstrated that dry cooling was economically viable in Mona, enabling USA Power to
acquire the water needed in a reasonable time and be prepared for online operation in 2005.
(R2051-53, 2157-59, 5155-56)  Waldron’s calculations and resulting conclusions were
considered by USA Power and Waldron to be confidential and proprietary.  (R2103-05,
6400)23
C. USA Power’s Determination the Spring Canyon Project Would Be
Economically Feasible
 USA Power commissioned, from Navigant Consulting, a study of the energy markets
in the western United States to confirm the economic feasibility of siting a power plant in
Mona.  (R10138-10202)  That study determined USA Power’s planned development of a
plant in Mona would have access to power markets in at least seven western states and
confirmed it could provide electricity to at least two primary markets:  the Utah and the
14
Southern California Markets.  (R10140-41)  Navigant confirmed there was an ever-growing
demand for power in the Utah power market and the Mona substation had the capacity to
accommodate transmission of the needed power, but there were no planned or existing
facilities that could serve this growing power need in Utah.  (R2103, 10138-55, 10191)  It
provided similar analyses with regard to the Southern California Market.  (R10148-54)
Navigant determined that the Utah market offered the best opportunity because of its
identified need for additional power that could not be met by PacifiCorp’s or any other
developer’s existing or planned power plants.  (R10138-202)  The study further estimated
fuel costs and market prices (R10182-89), concluding that Spring Canyon would have an
average annual “spark spread” (i.e., operating revenue after accounting for fuel costs) “of
$12.50 to $13.50 [per megawatt hour] during non-emergency market conditions.”  (R10189)
Accordingly, Navigant concluded that the Spring Canyon site had an “excellent opportunity”
to “strategically target markets,” including the Utah market.  (R10131, 10140)
USA Power used that analysis and extensive research regarding costs, including the
cost of using dry cooling, to develop economic proformas and cost studies over two years.
 (R2187)  Those proformas and studies demonstrated the project it designed and configured
on a site-specific basis for Mona was economically viable.  (R3721-29, 3732-33)
D. Acquisition of Assets for Spring Canyon Development
As of October 2001, there were major tasks that needed to be completed for the Spring
Canyon project, including the identification and purchase of water rights; preparation and
submission of documents to change the point of diversion for water rights with the Utah State
Engineer’s office; preparation and submission of an application for an air quality permit;
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assessment of the needs of local communities; identification of the plant’s wastewater and
gas line transmission requirements; determination of the power transmission corridor and
route; and the preparation of development plans.  (R1996, 1999, 2913-17, 3859)
By the beginning of 2003, USA Power, with Williams’ assistance and advice, had
acquired the most critical assets for the development of the power plant which USA Power
had configured.  USA Power had an option to purchase property .75 miles from the Mona
substation on which a power plant could be constructed and operated (Jan. 2002) (R9850-
63), it had applied for an air permit for operation of a power plant (Feb. 2002) (R10230-74),
USA Power had obtained a zoning variance to permit the operation of a power plant (July
2002) (R10235), the Utah Division of Air Quality (“UDAQ”) had issued an air permit for the
operation of a 280 MW plant (Nov. 2002) (R9954-82), USA Power had options to purchase
the water rights necessary to operate a power plant at the Spring Canyon site (Aug. 2002)
(R2011, 2014-19, 9909-52), the Utah Division of Water Rights had approved a change
application for the water rights to be used at the Spring Canyon site (Jan. 2003) (R10032-39),
USA Power had an interconnection agreement with PacifiCorp Transmission to interconnect
a power plant at the Spring Canyon site with the Mona substation (Sept. 2002) (R9983-86),
USA Power had a commitment from Questar to provide natural gas to the Spring Canyon
project (Sept. 2002) (R9988); and USA Power had obtained a final FERC determination that
Spring Canyon was an exempt wholesale generator.  (R6842)
E. USA Power’s Spring Canyon Project Was Confidential.
Consistent with industry standards, USA Power took reasonable steps to keep the
compilation of information it created and obtained confidential (R3720, 3723), because the
  The permit application, a publicly available document, disclosed general information24
about USA Power’s planned plant as was necessary to inform of the likely “impact that the
facility will have on the air quality in the area.”  (R2060, see 10232-274)  This information
included the likely emissions, model of turbines that would be used, the maximum generation
capacity, and the site location.  (R10235, 10240-43)  Likewise, an ordinance to change the
zoning of the planned location for the Spring Canyon was a public record.  (R2102, 10285)
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secrecy of a project is “the life blood of a developer.”  (R1998)  During discussions with
local officials, USA Power’s principals spoke only in general terms but maintained the
secrecy of the details of their project.  (R1972)  While USA Power was required to disclose
general information about its project in its air permit application submitted to the UDAQ in
February 2002, it did not disclose USA Power’s confidential information.  (R1992-93,
10230).  Indeed, as Rand Thurgood, PacifiCorp’s director of Resource Development
testified, even though PacifiCorp had obtained a copy of the air permit in September 2002,24
it did not then have sufficient information to determine the validity of the Spring Canyon
Project.  (R6383)
The critical aspects of the Spring Canyon project that would be necessary for a
competitor to create a competing project were never publicly disclosed.  These included  the
Project Performance Analysis (R3727, 10129-34); the analysis by Waldron as to a 1x1 vs.
2x1 configuration, their conceptual designs, and analysis of the energy penalty (R2102-03);
the power market study conducted by Navigant (R2103, 3726); the Fatal Flaw analysis by
ABB (R2103, 3727); the analysis of water requirements for the combined-cycle dry-cooled
plant (R2105, 3728); sales contract showing location, price and option terms for water rights
in Juab County, with accompanying due diligence performed by Williams/HRO (R9871-
9908, 2113, 3728, 9909-53); proforma economic assumptions, preliminary cost breakdown
  A “merchant” project is high risk, in that the developer builds a large generation asset25
without first identifying a guaranteed market for the additional power before construction,
based on the unspecified assumption the power will be sold on the wholesale market.  The
Spring Canyon project was not a merchant project but instead had strategically targeted
markets.  Indeed, its would-be equity investors did not invest in merchant plants.  (R3774-75)
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and detailed economic analysis amortizing initial investment and factoring the cost of fuel
supply, financing for a long-term power purchase agreement for Spring Canyon; and
financial proformas that showed the economic viability of the Spring Canyon project.
(R3726-29, 10041-10091, 9990-93) 
USA Power, moreover, required third parties to sign a Confidentiality Agreement
before USA Power disclosed its confidential information.  That agreement prevented the
third party from using or disclosing the confidential information except for the purpose of
evaluating whether to enter into a business transaction with USA Power.  (R2621-24)  In
addition, USA Power designated its information as “Confidential.”  (R2107-08, 2178)
Confidentiality Agreements are standard in the industry to protect the competitive advantage
a developer has gained through their hard work and expenditure of resources.  (R3723)
II. Panda Energy.
During the time USA Power was developing its Spring Canyon project, Panda Energy
(“Panda”) was a competitor pursuing its own project with regard to the Mona substation.
However, Panda had a different approach than USA Power and was targeting a different type
of development.  For example, Panda used a “merchant” development strategy without an
identified market before construction,  and Panda’s business model was to develop25
extremely high-capacity generation projects, including gas-fired plants that would produce
more than 2,000 MW.  (R1973, 3774-75)  Panda’s project for Mona targeted a 1,000 MW
  Panda had no experience with dry-cooled projects.  (R4616)26
  Spring Canyon’s transmission agreement made it first in “queue,” meaning it had priority27
for transmission capacity over later developments, and a new project connected to the station
would be significantly disadvantaged due to the increased usage cost.  (R2046-47, 3723)
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wet-cooled plant  (R2266, 4602); Panda had determined dry cooling was not economically26
viable in Mona.  (R4608, 4616, 8615-16)  Such large plants using wet cooling require an
enormous amount of water for cooling that would not likely be obtainable in arid Mona.
(R1976, 2267)  Indeed, Panda’s project would have required substantial capital investment
because the existing substation lacked capacity to handle a plant that large.  (R1976)
Unlike the Spring Canyon project, Panda’s progress was limited.  Panda never obtained
water rights, an air permit, rezoning, or a transmission agreement for the Mona substation,27
and never developed a financial analysis.  (R3302-08, 4709-20, 4723-24, 4728-29, 5458-89,
7215-16, 10401-02)  The only tangible assets held by Panda were options on land located
near the substation and meteorological data (“met data”).  (R4728-29, 4709-20, 4723-24)
III. USA Power Hires Williams as its Attorney to Serve on its Development Team.
In April, 2001, after deciding to develop a power project in Utah, but before its
selection of the exact site, USA Power began searching for a Utah attorney who specialized
in obtaining water for power generation facilities and who could provide comprehensive
representation concerning all aspects of the development and marketing of USA Power’s
power project.  (R1980-85, 1990)  
That month, Ted and David met with Jody Williams, who was then a partner at the law
firm of Kruse, Landa & Maycock (“KLM”) where Ted and Dave generally described the
nature of their power project, the need for comprehensive legal representation in the
  R1745-46, 2001-02, 2510-11, 2913-2920, R2 2911, 4636-37; see also R3748, 3767-6828
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development, and the need for all work to remain confidential and “under the radar.”   28
By the end of April, Williams agreed to represent USA Power on all aspects of the
development of its power project.  The scope of that representation is reflected in the “Client
Information Sheet” (R2691-92), the written retainer agreement (R2694-98), and the
statements for legal fees and costs.  (R2818-64, 2897-901, 2980-86, 2992-3039).  Williams
never indicated or even suggested that she considered her representation to be limited in any
manner or that she was terminating her representation of USA Power.  (R19834, 2280, 2561-
62, 2571, 3746-48)  Williams never advised USA Power that she had any conflict or potential
conflict of interest in representing it with regard to Spring Canyon.  (R1750, 1983-84, 2069,
2091)  In fact, USA Power would not have retained Williams had she indicated she had any
conflict of interest or attempted to limit her representation in any way.  (R2331)
Williams actively represented USA Power from April 2001 through November 2003
on a broad range of matters dealing with the development of Spring Canyon.  (R2694-98,
2801, R2 5211)  Williams advised USA Power about “all of the issues associated with the
project that were then current and . . . how [USA Power] would move on to the next step with
each issue.”  (R2000-01)  USA Power “did not make a move in Utah without asking Ms.
Williams for her opinion.”  (R1994)  Williams’ representation included:  (1) being a member
of and regularly meeting with the USA Power Development Team regarding strategy and
planning (R2000-05); (2)  the creation and registration with the State of Utah of the entity
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC to hold development assets of Spring Canyon (R2851-53, 3136-
40, 3142-65, 2469-72); (3) negotiating and drafting an option agreement to purchase real
  Because USA Power’s original air permit allowed a plant with only a 280 MW capacity,29
USA Power intended to purchase air credits which would allow it to develop and operate a
525 MW plant.  (R7347, 2070-75)
  R2818-35, 2841-43, 2855-64, 2907, 2972-86, 3000-06, 3012-14, 3167-91, 5825-33, 374830
  R2834-39, 2044, 2907-11, 3041-42, 2510-12, 2513, 2845-46, 2913-21, 2565-66, 2567,31
2568
  R2481-82, 2525-26, 2973-3005, 4854-5732
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property in Mona (R2848-53, 2921-39, 3116-20, 5821, 3748); (4) assisting with the
necessary permits and studies to allow USA Power to build a power plant on its optioned real
property including annexation agreements, a zoning variance, and air permits and air credits29
(R2821, 2831-35, 2841-43, 2859-64, 2940-62, 3116-20, 3748, 2903-05, 2980-86, 3190-91,
2384-88); (5) obtaining the water rights required for Spring Canyon, including the time
consuming task of identifying and contacting possible sellers, researching the ownership and
priority of the potential seller’s water rights, advising USA Power in the negotiations,
drafting the Option and Purchase Contracts for water rights, obtaining state approval of the
change in ownership of the water rights and change in the usage from surface water to
ground water;  and (6) other related services, including assisting USA Power in contacting30
PacifiCorp to obtain an interconnect study and interconnection agreement for the Mona
substation, keeping USA Power informed of the development of its competitor, Panda, and
working with local government to create public support for the project.31
Williams represented USA Power with regard to the Spring Canyon project while she
was a partner at KLM and after she became a partner at HRO in July 2002.  When Williams
joined HRO, she brought Steve Vuyovich, who had been an associate at KLM and worked
on USA matters, with her where he continued to work on USA Power matters.   Williams32
requested that USA Power agree she could continue to represent it with regard to the Spring
  R10127-291, 9848-10007; 2091-92, 2096-2102, 2106-2110, 4556-6833
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Canyon project and take USA Power files with her to HRO.  USA Power agreed and its files
were transferred from KLM to Williams at HRO.  (R2524-27, 2724)
HRO’s representation of USA Power with regard to Spring Canyon began before
Williams joined HRO.  In May 2002, Williams referred USA Power to a lawyer at HRO,
Blaine Rawson, to assist USA Power with air modeling issues for the air permit application.
Rawson represented USA Power on those issues, HRO was paid for those services (R2702-
2717, 3193-96), and Rawson continued to represent USA Power on various matters through
September 2003.  (R2385-86, 2389-91, 2392-95, 2399, 2407-08, 2897-901)
USA Power paid nearly $100,000 for the legal services Williams/HRO provided in
their representation of USA Power on the Spring Canyon project.  (R2818-64, 2897-901,
2972-86, 2992-3019, 3679)
IV. USA Power and Williams/HRO’s Marketing of the Spring Canyon Project.
In late Spring 2002, USA Power began to market Spring Canyon.  Those efforts
included attempts to secure construction financing and an equity partner able to assist with
the development’s completion, and finding a purchaser for Spring Canyon.  (R10133)
To market the project, USA Power and Williams prepared a preliminary offering
memorandum in two binders that contained the confidential work product of USA Power and
its consultants.   Williams/HRO discussed the confidential material in the binders with Ted,33
Lois and Dave.  (R2571-75, 2972-90, 3862-67)
Williams also was actively involved in USA Power’s efforts to market the Spring
Canyon project to potential purchasers.  She set up and attended meetings with third parties
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such as UAMPS.  (R1889, 2126-28, 2140, 2564, 4554-55, 3857-61)  Williams, moreover,
was involved in and gave advice to USA Power in its negotiations with PacifiCorp regarding
the Spring Canyon project to PacifiCorp.  For example, before USA Power’s first meeting
with PacifiCorp on August 22, 2002, Williams provided Ted and Lois with advice about
negotiating strategies, the importance of having a confidentiality agreement, and the agenda
for USA Power and PacifiCorp’s negotiations.  (R1897-1901, 2094-95, 2339-42)  After the
meeting with PacifiCorp, Ted and Lois again consulted with Williams.  (R2139-40, 2344-46,
1885-90, 1893-96, 1908)  Before USA Power’s next meeting with PacifiCorp on September
11, 2002, Williams agreed to call Rand Thurgood, PacifiCorp’s director of Resource
Development, whom Williams knew from prior employment at PacifiCorp, and say “nice
things” about USA Power to facilitate negotiations.  (R2089-91, 3041-42)  In addition,
Williams encouraged USA Power to continue its negotiations with PacifiCorp.  (R2345-46)
V. PacifiCorp Contacts USA Power about Purchasing Spring Canyon and Obtains USA
Power’s Confidential Information Pursuant to a Confidentiality Agreement.
In August 2002, Thurgood contacted USA Power and said he was interested in
discussing the Spring Canyon project.  (R2079-80)  At the time, Thurgood was investigating
opportunities for developing new power generation assets for PacifiCorp.  (R8330-31)
Thurgood and his development team had never developed a combined-cycle or dry-cooled
power plant, and had experience only with minor power projects requiring minimal
permitting and site work.  (R4699-70, 4701-02, 4828-29)  PacifiCorp had not focused on
Mona as a site for a power plant.  (R2118-19, 4514-15, 4705, 5088K-N)
USA Power’s first meeting with Thurgood was held at PacifiCorp’s Portland, Oregon
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office on August 22, 2002.  USA Power described its basic vision for Spring Canyon, but
told Thurgood it would not divulge any further information until PacifiCorp signed a
Confidentiality Agreement.  It gave Thurgood a draft of a Confidentiality and Non-
Disclosure Agreement (“Confidentiality Agreement”) to review with PacifiCorp’s corporate
counsel.  (R2082, 2084-86, 2621-24)
The parties met again on September 11, 2002 at PacifiCorp’s Salt Lake offices.  At the
meeting, PacifiCorp signed the Confidentiality Agreement.  In that Agreement, PacifiCorp
agreed it would be receiving confidential information about the Spring Canyon project:
[PacifiCorp] and USA Power will evaluate a . . . transaction relating to a power
project site development known as the Spring Canyon Energy LLC Generation
plant . . . and each will be receiving, reviewing, and analyzing information with
respect to the Potential Transaction that is confidential, proprietary, or otherwise
not publicly available.  (R2621)
PacifiCorp further agreed not to use or disclose that confidential information for any purpose
other than evaluating a potential purchase of the Spring Canyon project or a partnership with
USA Power Partners.  (R 2621-24, 4788-91)
After PacifiCorp signed the Confidentiality Agreement, USA Power shared Volumes
I (R10127-291) and II (R9848-10007) of its confidential information with PacifiCorp.  Both
volumes were clearly stamped “Confidential.”  The confidential information in Volumes I
and II included the “site specific” reports and data from Waldron, including the “water
balance table” and “performance curves” for Spring Canyon, which made specific findings
regarding its cost, performance, water usage and any loss of efficiency for a dry-cooled plant
in Mona (R10275-84); Navigant’s Marketing Study addressing the need for a power plant
resource in Utah  (R10131, 10138-202); a description of the project, including its land and
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water rights (R10129-30, 10132-34, 9850-953); engineering drawings of the proposed plant
layout (R10222-24); the Fatal Flaw Analysis (R10203-21); and a “marketing letter” from
Williams which described the acquisition and planned diversion of water (R9866-69).
At the September 11 meeting, Thurgood confirmed PacifiCorp’s acute need for power
by April 2005 and its strong interest in acquiring Spring Canyon.  (R2116-18, 10396-403)
Thurgood told USA Power it had a “competitive advantage” that would “take him 2-3 years
to duplicate and several million dollars.”  (R2116)  Thurgood also confirmed PacifiCorp had
never considered using dry cooling in Mona until he saw USA Power’s confidential
information showing it was viable.  (R2114-15, 4517)
USA Power and PacifiCorp’s negotiations and further disclosures of USA Power’s
confidential information continued over the next six months.  One of the main confidential
topics discussed during that time was USA Power’s use of dry cooling.  Beginning at the
September 11 meeting, Thurgood specifically asked USA Power to address his concerns
about the “loss in efficiency” – i.e., the energy penalty – from using dry cooling at Mona.
(R2114-15)  During these conversations, Thurgood was adamant dry cooling could not work
in Mona due to the energy penalty.  (R 2141-43)  The efficiency of dry cooling remained a
topic of conversation and resulted in further confidential disclosures by USA Power.
For example, Ted and Thurgood had a conversation for 96 minutes on November 21,
2002, which dealt with the specific issues of plant output and overall efficiency in light of
dry cooling.  (R2141-43, 5843, 5902)  On November 26, 2002, USA Power responded to
Thurgood’s continued expression of doubt by delivering, subject to the Confidentiality
Agreement, a report commissioned by USA Power and conducted by Waldron, which
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specifically addressed loss of efficiency with dry cooling in Mona.  (R2157-59, 2664, 5155-
56)  In the report, Waldron stated the loss of efficiency from using dry cooling at Mona
would be less than 3%, even on the hottest days, and the additional capital cost to construct
the air-cooled condenser would be approximately $20 million.  (R2141-43, 2153-59, 2164-
65, 5155-56)  These figures were not random or arbitrary; rather they were compiled after
more than a year of detailed testing by Waldron, which had evaluated and rejected various
options for the Mona site in order to find the correct plant combination in regard to output,
water usage and overall efficiency.  (R2050-51, 2153-56, 4666-67)
The issue of dry cooling at the Mona site was again raised at a meeting on February
18, 2003.  Notes by Ian Andrews’ (a principal engineer in PacifiCorp’s resource development
group) of the meeting reflect direct communications with USA Power regarding its testing:
“air cooled vs. water cooled . . . looked at Hybrid . . . over 90 degree day almost mirror
water cool.”  (R5837)  These notes reflect USA Power’s February 18 statements that its
hybrid design (an air cooled condenser with inlet chiller) nearly matched the output of a
water-cooled facility even on the hottest days in Mona.  (R5155-56) 
At the February 18 meeting, USA Power also provided PacifiCorp with Volume III of
USA Power’s confidential information – stamped “Confidential” – which contained detailed
cost information and financial proformas for their proposed combined cycle, dry-cooled plant
at Mona.  (R10011-10090; 2172-73, 4559-63)  That work product represented years of work
by the principals of USA Power and its consultants in assessing costs and estimating
profitability.  That information demonstrated Spring Canyon was financially viable.  (R2159,
2181, 2223, 5155-56)  Volume III also contained a proprietary marketing study
  PacifiCorp’s receipt and review of Volume III is confirmed by Ian Andrews’ February 1834
notes which referenced confidential financial data from Volume III, including “18% pre-tax
ROI” and “8% higher total cost for 1x1 vs. 2x1.”  (R5837-39)
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commissioned by USA Power indicating PacifiCorp would save “$20-$40 million per year”
by building the Spring Canyon project at Mona, rather than buying power from independent
sources.   (R10016-17) 34
After reviewing USA Power’s confidential information, PacifiCorp, by early 2003,
acknowledged Spring Canyon was “the only viable project site that [was] capable of meeting
a 2005 online date” (R10398, 10400), and that “[a]bsent the USA Power site, [PacifiCorp is]
unaware of other entities capable of meeting an April 2005 date.”  (R10399)  Thurgood also
acknowledged USA Power “had done so much work on the project that nobody stood a
chance to beat [it].”  (R2217, 4580)
VI. PacifiCorp Decides to Build Its Own Power Plant in Mona, And Authorizes the
Purchase of Spring Canyon for that Purpose
PacifiCorp first memorialized its recommendation to build a plant in Mona in a January
9, 2003 memorandum.  (R10391-95)  The memorandum summarized the power need
identified by PacifiCorp’s Integrated Resource Plan (the “IRP”) and noted that “the single
most challenging aspect of the IRP, is the time frame in which the initial resources are
needed.  The IRP requires 200MW of new peaking capacity in calendar year 2005 . . .”
(R10392)  The memorandum further stated “[t]he only project that has any possibility of
meeting heavy load hour peaking for a 2005 or even a 2006 commercial date is the Spring
Canyon project.”  (R10394)  The January 9 memorandum also recommended PacifiCorp
purchase the Spring Canyon project and represented that it could be acquired for $5 million
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or less.  There was no mention of Panda.  (R10391-95)  
In a later memorandum, dated February 5, 2003, PacifiCorp sought approval to
purchase Spring Canyon for up to $3.5 million and Panda’s assets for $964,818.81.
(R10396-403)  The memorandum stated the purchase of Panda’s assets was “expected to be
instrumental in negotiations with respect to the only known site that can accommodate
combined cycle construction to meet the April 2005 timeline” – Spring Canyon.  (R10400)
Panda’s assets included only two items of any actual value to PacifiCorp:  one year of met
data and two real estate options.  (R4710-20, 4728-29)
PacifiCorp’s intent in purchasing Panda’s assets was to gain a bargaining chip in its
negotiations with USA Power.  (R2264, 10400)  The February 5 memorandum recommended
PacifiCorp utilize a combined cycle design, because it was “[t]he most cost effective resource
design for meeting the 2005 peaking need.”  (R10400)  PacifiCorp determined “[o]wning the
Panda position is critical to defining the limits of further negotiations with USA Power
because [owning Panda] provides PacifiCorp with a viable build option to meet the April
2005 peaking date (albeit with a simple cycle design.)”  (Id., emphasis added)  By
PacifiCorp’s own admission, Panda’s assets were not sufficient, alone, to permit PacifiCorp
to complete a more cost efficient combined-cycle power plant in time to meet the April 2005
deadline.  (Id.)  Rather, if PacifiCorp were to successfully acquire both Spring Canyon and
Panda, PacifiCorp could “combine the projects and immediately begin engineering to secure
a viable combined cycle build option for meeting the April 2005 target date for a peaking
resource.”  (Id.)
The recommendations in the February 5  memo were approved that same day.  Bob
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Van Englehoven was selected to lead the development effort for the new plant to be built at
Mona - named “Currant Creek.”  (R4798, 4811-13, 4840)  On February 24, 2003, PacifiCorp
finalized its purchase of Panda’s assets.  (R5458-5489)
VII. PacifiCorp Agrees to Purchase Spring Canyon, Abruptly Reneges on its Agreement,
Announces the Issuance of an RFP, and PacifiCorp’s Reasons for Doing So.
At the February 18 meeting, PacifiCorp – which had already contracted with Panda –
verbally offered $5 million to purchase Spring Canyon’s project, a fact confirmed in
Andrews’ notes stating, “go on record with offer.  USA Power asks that the offer be put in
writing.”  (R5837; 2173-76, 4561-63)  A series of written offers and counter offers followed
and, on March 14, 2003, PacifiCorp agreed to purchase Spring Canyon for $3 million and
a five-year development agreement, under which USA Power’s principals would be
employed to assist in the development of other generation projects.  (R2210-13, 3259, 3669,
4564-68)
PacifiCorp and USA Power agreed the parties would meet in Portland on March 17 to
finalize the deal.  That very day, however, after USA Power’s principals had already arrived
in Oregon to sign the agreement, PacifiCorp reneged via voicemail.  (R2210-16, 4565-68)
PacifiCorp informed USA Power that it would issue a Request For Proposals (“RFP”) to
“request and evaluate proposals from third parties to fulfill a portion of the supply-side
resource need identified in PacifiCorp’s [IRP].”  (R2 675, R2217-18, 4565)  PacifiCorp
assured USA Power the RFP bid was “yours to lose” since it was the only project that could
be operational in time to satisfy PacifiCorp’s projected power shortage in 2005.  (R2217-18)
PacifiCorp and Thurgood had their own reasons for reneging on the agreement with
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USA Power and issuing an RFP.  Scottish Power, the sole shareholder of PacifiCorp, was
unhappy with PacifiCorp’s financial return through the Utah rate base, and constructing its
own plant in Mona based on its own development after winning the RFP would ensure
PacifiCorp would be allowed a return on the entire capital investment for development and
construction.  (R3678-79)  In addition, obtaining a return on a wholly-owned plant would
enhance PacifiCorp’s assets if Scottish Power decided to sell PacifiCorp, which it did shortly
after Currant Creek was constructed.  (R3331, 3679)  The Utah Public Service Commission
(“PSC”), moreover, made it clear public utilities, such as PacifiCorp, could only earn a return
through rate base and not as independent power producers, which would be achieved if
PacifiCorp built its own plant after winning the RFP.  (R3678-79, 3801-02)  Thurgood also
had a personal stake in the matter.  He was embarrassed that another company had developed
a power project in his backyard, and feared he may lose his job if PacifiCorp did not
“develop” and construct the plant in Mona.  (R2115, 2303)  Buying USA Power’s project
would not meet PacifiCorp or Thurgood’s objectives.  (R3678-79, 3801-02)
VIII. Williams/HRO’s Adverse Representation of PacifiCorp, Use and Disclosure of USA
Power’s Confidential Information and Crucial Role in Obtaining Firm Water Supply
for Currant Creek.
Thurgood, with his and PacifiCorp’s objectives firmly in mind, retained USA Power’s
lawyers Williams/HRO to accomplish their objectives.  Two weeks before PacifiCorp
reneged on its agreement with USA Power, Thurgood retained Williams/HRO to acquire
water rights for Currant Creek using the Panda location.  (R2732)  As both PacifiCorp and
Williams admitted, PacifiCorp could not win the RFP bid and be awarded the CC&N without
a firm water supply.  (R3639, 6483 at n.7, 6484)  PacifiCorp charged Williams/HRO with
  R1831-32, 2334-35, 2423-24, 4737-40, 4775-76, 9832, 9866-6935
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the responsibility of acquiring the necessary water rights.  PacifiCorp knew Williams/HRO
was representing USA Power and there may be a a conflict of interest but never considered
retaining any other water lawyer.  Williams, based on the work she had done as USA35
Power’s lawyer, could quickly evaluate potential sellers and secure the necessary water for
PacifiCorp’s competing project so PacifiCorp could be awarded the RFP.  (R2334, 3748; see
R2886-95)
Williams/HRO, before they were formally retained by PacifiCorp, disclosed some of
USA Power’s confidential information to PacifiCorp.  In February 2003, Williams, in a
conversation with PacifiCorp, disclosed the identity of the small pool of potential sellers of
water rights in Mona, the range at which these potential sellers may sell their water rights,
and the confidential purchase price that USA Power had purchased its water rights for Spring
Canyon – all confidential information Williams/HRO had acquired while representing USA
Power.  (R7137, see also 2280-81, 2890, 8167 at 29-34)  
Once Williams/HRO fomally began representing PacifiCorp, they used and disclosed
USA Power’s confidential information to benefit PacifiCorp.  Williams contacted the very
pool of potential sellers that she had developed on USA Power’s dollar to attempt to
purchase water rights for PacifiCorp, including Noreen Harper (R2740-47, R2 2919); Don
Jones (R2744-47, 3061-63, 2837-43, 2848-57, 2919); Nephi Irrigation (R7137, 2837, 8167
at 33); and Michael Keyte (R3044-47, 2845-65).  Williams helped Thurgood draft a
memorandum seeking approval from PacifiCorp to purchase water rights in which the
confidential range of potential purchase prices were disclosed.  (R 2886-95, 8167 at 30)
  R2462-63, 2534-35, 2544, 2577, 2580, 2777-80, 2782-83, 2807-11, 2866, 2868-71, 2878-36
79, 2886-95, 3044-47, 3055-59, 3643, 8167 at 30, 81-82.
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PacifiCorp offered exactly the same purchase price for water rights for Currant Creek that
USA Power had confidentially paid for its water rights.  (R2280-81)
Williams also became a member of PacifiCorp’s development team, just as she had
been a member of USA Power’s development team.  She attended the development group
meetings where all aspects of PacifiCorp’s Currant Creek competing project were discussed,
such as Currant Creek being the cost based alternative to the RFP bids, including USA
Power’s; the tight timeline for submitting competing bids; the critical need for water for the
competing project; water needs for wet versus dry cooling; the decision to use dry cooling;
the suitability of Mona as the site for the power plant; and the design of the Currant Creek
plant and the Spring Canyon project.   Williams/HRO drafted documents to acquire water36
rights for Currant Creek; reviewed change applications, including USA Power’s; and advised
on matters relative to the development of Currant Creek.  (R2550, 2732-2816 (2740-42,
2754-80), 2878-79, 2886-95, 3065-67)  Williams testified she did not know whether she had
disclosed USA Power’s confidential information to PacifiCorp.  (R2543)
Williams/HRO’s role in acquiring a firm water supply for PacifiCorp was pivotal.
Based on the work Williams had done and knowledge she had gained while representing
USA Power, Williams/HRO were able to “duplicate[] efforts for PacifiCorp in 20% of the
time that it took her to perform those efforts for [USA Power].”  (R2334)  By May 2003,
Williams/HRO was able to determine that there were no sellers of large quantities of water
rights that could be used in Mona.  (R6762; 4835-36, 4966-74)  Williams then devised a
  On May 12, 2003, according to the notes of Ian Andrews, Jody Williams first suggested37
that PacifiCorp “[d]rill @ Mona use Utah Lake water.”  (R5839)
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strategy to obtain water by drilling a new well at Mona (rather than piping it there) by relying
on water rights from a Utah Lake point of diversion.   She also determined that this plan was37
viable, as she told PacifiCorp, based on “Juab hydrology” and information from the “Ut.
Dept. Nat. Res.” showing Juab was only using a portion of its potential water.  (R5839)
Williams/HRO was aware that placing a new well in Mona for Currant Creek threatened the
existing water rights owners in Juab County, including USA Power, by adding a new user
to the aquifer from a different point of diversion that had priority over existing users.
(R5506-08, 2580, 6421-23)
Mark Wangsgard and Bill White, the landowners who sold the water to PacifiCorp
from a remote site, gave Williams credit for being pivotal in the success of the unique
transaction to acquire water rights for PacifiCorp.  They stated that Williams “saved the day”
because she “single handedly” overcame local opposition and regulatory obstacles.  (R3065-
67)  From their perspective, the deal “would not have been possible without her.”  (Id.)
Williams/HRO never told USA Power they were representing PacifiCorp on its
competing power project or sought its consent.  (R2279-80, 2559, 3749)  PacifiCorp was the
more lucrative, long-term client for Williams/HRO.  (R2732-816)
IX. PacifiCorp’s Preparation and Submission of a Competing RFP Bid in an Unrealistic
Time Frame and Use of USA Power’s Confidential Information to Win the RFP.
In connection with its intention to issue the RFP, PacifiCorp began preparing its
competing project to submit a bid in the RFP.  PacifiCorp called it the Next Best Alternative
(“NBA”) – Currant Creek – which ostensibly was to be a virtual bid to evaluate the cost of
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each submitted proposal.  (R684)
The standard in the industry for developing the type of power project for which
PacifiCorp was going to submit an RFP bid is 18 to 24 months.  PacifiCorp had
approximately 4 months in which to develop its project and submit a bid.  (R2686, 6378-79,
3729-31)  PacifiCorp, when it began, did not have three of the four critical components
necessary to develop a power project and win the RFP – a firm water supply, an air permit
and a fuel supply.  (R3732, 5088X; see 3705)  PacifiCorp also had not done any site specific
testing to site a plant at Mona or to verify dry cooling was viable at Mona.  (R4518-20; 3707-
09, 3730-32, 4831-32, 4844-45)  At the time, PacifiCorp had no guaranty it could acquire
sufficient water rights for a wet-cooled plant in arid Mona and only had USA Power’s
confidential information that a dry-cooled plant there was economically viable.  PacifiCorp
nonetheless moved forward with the RFP requiring a connection to the Mona substation and
took significant steps developing its own project sited at the Panda site in Mona.  (R3730-31)
PacifiCorp relied on USA Power’s analyses of dry cooling in moving forward with
developing Currant Creek.  Andrews, two days after meeting with USA Power on February
18, sent an email to Robert Van Englehoven, who was charged with selecting an engineer
to develop Currant Creek, telling Van Englehoven in the Scope of Work for engineers to
“stress dry cooling experience” and “experience with inlet chillers on F class machines.”
(R4841-42, 5012)  Both of these were unique characteristics of Spring Canyon project.
PacifiCorp did not interview engineers for the Mona project until April 17, 2003.
After it selected Shaw, Stone & Webster (“Shaw”), Shaw met with Thurgood’s
development team, on April 24, 2003,  to “kick off” the development effort of the Mona
  PacifiCorp’s request on May 7, 2003 that the engineering firm Burns & McDonnell38
(“Burns”) do an “independent valuation” of wet vs. dry cooling (R4833-34, 4964) was
pretextual.  Burns did not do a detailed, site specific evaluation of the different possible plant
configurations, and PacifiCorp did not rely on the preliminary testing in making its decision.
(R9159)  As Thurgood testified regarding that preliminary testing, “it was a very cursory
study done very quickly, [in] a week or two’s time frame.”  (R9159)
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project.  An initial task list was passed out at that time as “a first attempt to bring
organization” to the project.  Thurgood, in discussing the future organization of the “Mona
Project,” told his development team that “we need a very clear trail of how we arrived at the
Mona site.”  (R4962; 4824-26)  As of April 24, PacifiCorp still had not performed any on-
site modeling or testing at the Mona site, had not yet independently calculated the “energy
penalty” for developing a dry-cooled plant at this site or at this elevation, and had not done
a detailed water balance study.  All of these are critical tasks that are done prior to the
selection of a site – not afterwards.  (R4518-20, 4831-32, 4844-45, 3707-09)  
On May 16, 2003, PacifiCorp formally switched Currant Creek to dry cooling.
(R4966-74, 4976-77, 9131)  At the time, however, PacifiCorp had not obtained the tests
ultimately required to evaluate wet vs. dry cooling to determine if dry cooling was
economically viable in Mona.  (R4131, 6993-99)  The initial decision to pursue a project with
dry cooling, before the formal approval, was made when PacifiCorp possessed only USA
Power’s site-specific performance evaluations.   Only preliminary calculations had been38
requested of PacifiCorp’s engineers before May 16 and Shaw’s performance evaluations
regarding dry cooling and the proposed Currant Creek plant, including performance curves,
were not received until well after May 16.  (R4128-32, 4967-73, 6993-7000)  Thurgood’s
request that the Current Creek project be switched to dry-cooling does not rely upon any site-
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specific studies of the economic feasibility in Mona from any engineer retained by
PacifiCorp.  (R4966-73)  From May 16 forward, Currant Creek was pursued as a dry-cooled
plant requiring approximately 400 a/f of annual water use, as opposed to a wet-cooled plant
requiring 4,000 a/f.  (R4966-74, 4976-77)
On June 6, 2003, PacifiCorp issued the RFP seeking a resource with base and peaking
power using the Mona substation that could be online by spring 2005.  (R2 673-78, 679-99)
All bids were required to be submitted by July 22, 2003.  The RFP expressly stated
PacifiCorp would “maintain the confidentiality of all bids.”  (R2 678; R681)  The RFP also
noted that “[a]ffiliate companies of PacifiCorp may not respond to this RFP.”  (R681)
PacifiCorp indicated it would use the NBA to evaluate the cost of each proposal.  (R684)
PacifiCorp would “award weighting based upon how the bid cost compares to the cost of the
NBA.”  (Id.)  PacifiCorp, however, stated it was “unlikely that any ‘virtual’ project will win,”
because a virtual bid has no real assets and is used to evaluate other bidders.  (R2231-32) 
USA Power, on July 18, 2003, submitted four pricing proposals in response to the RFP
using its Spring Canyon project as the site for the generation facility.  (R5196-210)  The
pricing proposals were for both peaking (with duct burners) and baseload (without duct
burners) production that could be online by May 1, 2005.  (R5199-200)  At the time of the
submission, USA Power was the only bidder that had already developed a power project to
interconnect with the Mona substation.  (R5200)
 PacifiCorp submitted its competing bid – Currant Creek – on July 22.  It was identical
in all material respects to Spring Canyon.  (R2294-97, 3733)  The most noteworthy
similarities (and change from the prior Panda project) was that the project was now 525 MW
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and dry cooled.  The identical items include the size and capacity of the plant; the location
of plant (Juab County:  one mile west of Mona); the use of a dry-cooled condenser; the
combined-cycle combustion design; the size and brand of gas turbines (GE 7FA);
configuring the turbines in a 2x1 design; source of fuel (natural gas) that was connected to
Questar’s Mainline 104, rather than Kern River’s, pipeline; using “zero discharge” waste
technology; peaking capability through the use of duct burners to increase capacity of the
steam turbines to a level that “is approximately the same”; the cost of project (approx.
$340M); and the use of the same lawyers William/HRO.  (R2294-2312, 3733)
As USA Power’s expert opined:  “It is unreasonable for PacifiCorp to claim it
independently performed the work within 4 months when development of a similar project
typically requires (at minimum) 18 to 24 months.”  (R3729)  PacifiCorp used USA Power’s
confidential information (and lawyer) to develop its competing project.  (R3729-34)
PacifiCorp did not return USA Power’s confidential information before it prepared its
competing bid for Current Creek.  Despite USA Power’s request for PacifiCorp to return its
three binders of confidential information, PacifiCorp only returned Volume I on March 26,
2003.  (R2238-44, 6645)  PacifiCorp did not return Volume II until the day it submitted its
competing RFP bid.  (R2344, 6283)  PacifiCorp never returned Volume III.  (R2242-45)
In addition, to ensure there was no trace of PacifiCorp’s use of USA Power’s
confidential information, Thurgood deleted all emails regarding Spring Canyon.  (R4802-03)
Moreover, Thurgood’s notebook which detailed his work from September 2002 to September
2003 was conveniently “lost” even though all his other work notebooks were available.
(R4799-4800)
  Even though PacifiCorp secretly accepted its own bid in September, it continued to have39
discussions with USA Power about two of its bids until late October.  (R2271-75, 2688-89,
3229-31)
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X. PacifiCorp Awards Itself the Contract, Spring Canyon Is Ranked Second, and There
Is No Room for Another Plant in Mona.
The PacifiCorp Board of Directors in September 2003 approved the Currant Creek
project for construction.   (R3326-28)  USA Power’s bid came in second.  (R2 4265, 5842,39
5847, 5337, 4695-96)  PacifiCorp did not announce that it had awarded itself the RFP bid
until November 3, 2003 when it filed an application with the PSC for a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity (“CC&N”) to construct the Currant Creek plant.  (R2275-76)
During the course of the proceedings before the PSC, Thurgood admitted to Ted “we
learned a lot from you guys.”  That comment was in response to the observation by Ted that
PacifiCorp’s Currant Creek project was materially identical to Spring Canyon.  (R2303-04)
The PSC awarded PacifiCorp the CC&N to construct Currant Creek on March 5, 2004.
(R5283-309)  It is not technically or economically viable to have more than one power plant
in Mona.  (R2328, 2866, 2907, 3643, 3723, 3787)
XI. USA Power Discovers Williams/HRO’s Secret Representation of PacifiCorp.
Sometime between November 4 and November 6, 2003, Keyte, from whom USA
Power had purchased its water rights, phoned Ted to inform him that he had witnessed
Williams publicly appearing as counsel for PacifiCorp at a meeting with hostile owners of
water rights in the Mona area.  (R2281-82)  Williams/HRO’s representation was confirmed
shortly thereafter by newspaper press releases.  (Id.)  
On November 6, 2003, USA Power emailed Williams demanding an explanation for
  USA Power disagrees with the independent and alternative grounds on which the district40
court granted summary judgment on the intentional interference, unjust enrichment, and
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, but does not seek reversal of
this part of the ruling, or revival of these three claims.
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her representation of PacifiCorp, expressing “grave disappointment” at the representation,
and expressly noting USA Power’s concern that Williams/HRO’s representation of
PacifiCorp would inevitably and irreparably harm USA Power's interests and existing water
rights.  (R2 5211)  Williams/HRO never responded to USA Power’s email – instead, they
informed PacifiCorp that USA Power was mad about Williams/HRO representing a
competitor and continued to represent PacifiCorp on the Currant Creek project in its efforts
to have a CC&N issued.  (R2782-84, 3076, 2589-91, 7147 (at “6)”))
XII. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment and the District Court Decision.
On February 18, 2005, USA Power filed suit against Williams/HRO, and on October
26, 2005 filed its Second Amended Complaint joining PacifiCorp as a defendant.  (R1-21,
759-939)  USA Power alleged claims against PacifiCorp for (1) violation of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, (2) breach of contract, (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, (4) intentional interference with existing contractual relations, and (5) unjust
enrichment (R779-87).  USA Power alleged claims against Williams/HRO for breach of (1)
the fiduciary duty of loyalty and (2) the fiduciary duty of confidentiality.  (R783-85).
On April 30, 2007, PacifiCorp moved for summary judgment on all USA Power’s
claims against PacifiCorp.   (R8555-98)  On January 30, 2007 and April 30, 2007,40
Williams/HRO filed motions for summary judgment on USA Power’s claims for breach of
the fiduciary duties of loyalty and confidentiality.  (R1690A-1690C, 4392-94)  USA Power
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opposed PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO’s motions for summary judgment with memoranda,
an extensive record, and in oral argument.  (R3927-89, 5904-95, 6004-130, 8167-68)
On October 15, 2007, the district court released a memorandum decision granting
PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO’s motions for summary judgment on all USA Power’s claims,
leaving only a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty claim to the extent it sought the remedy
of disgorgement.  (See generally R7599-7624)  As an initial matter, the district court ruled
USA Power failed to “specifically controvert” the vast majority of PacifiCorp’s statements
of “undisputed fact” (“Statement”) as required under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.  (R7603-05)  The district court ruled USA Power's identification of disputed
inferences flowing from PacifiCorp's “undisputed material facts” did not “specifically
controvert” those facts as contemplated by Rule 7.  (Id.)  Based on that ruling, the district
court deemed substantially all of PacifiCorp's “undisputed material facts” admitted.  (Id.) 
Based on the “deemed admitted” ruling, the district court granted summary judgment
on the claims against PacifiCorp by concluding:  (1) for the trade secret claim, that it was
undisputed USA Power did not have a trade secret and PacifiCorp did not misappropriate a
trade secret of USA Power and (2) for the breach of the confidentiality agreement claim, that
it was undisputed PacifiCorp did not use USA Power’s confidential information.  (R7606,
7611-12)  The district court also granted summary judgment on the claims against
Williams/HRO by concluding:  (1) on the breach of the duty of confidentiality claim, it was
undisputed Williams/HRO did not use or disclose USA Power’s confidential information and
(2) on the breach of the duty of loyalty claim, it was undisputed that no breach of the duty
of loyalty caused USA Power damage.  (R7618-21)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the district court’s summary judgment in favor of PacifiCorp
and Williams/HRO and against USA Power on the grounds there are disputed issues of
material fact with regard to each element of each claim on which the district court
erroneously ruled the facts were not disputed and found defendants were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.  In reaching its conclusion as to each claim, the district court erroneously
ruled PacifiCorp’s statement of facts were not disputed, failed to draw reasonable inferences
in USA Power’s favor, weighed the evidence, determined credibility and ignored the
voluminous record USA Power submitted demonstrating there were disputed issues of
material fact precluding summary judgment.
As a general and broad sweeping error infecting the district court’s entire ruling, the
court erroneously deemed PacifiCorp’s statement of purported “facts” admitted under Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 7 and, based on that error, concluded PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO
were entitled to summary judgment.  USA Power, in compliance with Rule 7, stated verbatim
each of PacifiCorp’s purported “facts” it disputed, explained the grounds for the dispute and
cited admissible evidence demonstrating the dispute.  In addition, USA Power, as authorized
by Rule 7, presented by paragraph with record citation, additional disputed facts
demonstrating there were disputed issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.
The district court compounded that broad, sweeping error by erroneously failing to
draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to USA Power.  Based on the
disputed and undisputed facts, reasonable inferences could be drawn in USA Power’s favor
which demonstrated there were disputed issues of material fact on each element of each
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claim on which the district court granted PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO summary judgment.
The district court, contrary to Utah law, also weighed the evidence and made credibility
determinations between the evidence presented by defendants and by USA Power, ruling that
PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO’s evidence was more credible than USA Power’s admissible
evidence, which the district court completely disregarded by labeling it “speculative.”
The district court, moreover, erred with regard to its specific rulings on each of USA
Power’s primary claims against PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO.  
Trade Secret Claim Against PacifiCorp.  The district court erroneously ruled, as a
matter of law, that there was no evidence USA Power had a trade secret.  USA Power
demonstrated, with citation to admissible evidence, it had a trade secret consisting of the
whole of its secret and proprietary compilation of elements of the Spring Canyon project,
which took years and millions of dollars to create.  The Spring Canyon project, as a whole,
derived great value from not being generally known or ascertainable by proper means, and
demonstrated a 550 MW power plant designed as an air (not water) cooled, gas-fired,
combined-cycle plant in a 2 x 1 configuration with F7A GE turbines and duct firing was both
technologically feasible and economically viable at Mona, Utah.  
The district court also erroneously ruled, as a matter of law, that there was no evidence
PacifiCorp misappropriated a trade secret of USA Power.  USA Power, with citation to
admissible evidence, demonstrated PacifiCorp misappropriated its trade secret, including
based on evidence that PacifiCorp had access to the trade secret and that PacifiCorp’s
Currant Creek development was similar in all material respects to Spring Canyon.
Breach of Confidentiality Agreement Claim Against PacifiCorp.  The district court
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erroneously ruled there was no evidence PacifiCorp breached its Confidentiality Agreement
with USA Power.  USA Power, with citation to admissible evidence, demonstrated
PacifiCorp used USA Power’s confidential information for its own benefit in violation of the
Confidentiality Agreement based on the same evidence which demonstrated PacifiCorp
misappropriated USA Power’s trade secret.
Breach of the Fiduciary Duty of Confidentiality Against HRO/Williams.  The district
court erroneously ruled there was no evidence Williams/HRO used and/or disclosed USA
Power’s confidential information.  USA Power, with citation to both direct and
circumstantial evidence, demonstrated Williams/HRO used and disclosed USA Power’s
confidential information, including the confidential purchase price USA Power paid for its
water rights, the refined pool of potential sellers of water rights, and the range of prices for
water rights that Williams/HRO had learned and developed while representing USA Power
and for which USA Power paid over $100,000.  USA Power also demonstrated that well-
reasoned authority from other jurisdictions would permit a jury to infer use and/or disclosure
from the sole fact that Williams/HRO simultaneously and adversely represented USA
Power’s direct competitor, PacifiCorp.
Breach of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty Against HRO/Williams.  The district court
erroneously ruled there was no evidence any breach of Williams/HRO’s duty of loyalty
caused USA Power to suffer any damage.  USA Power, with record citations to admissible
evidence, demonstrated that, but for Williams/HRO’s breach of fiduciary duty, there is a
reasonable likelihood PacifiCorp would have purchased the Spring Canyon development
from USA Power for $3 million and a Joint Development Agreement or, in the alternative,
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but for Williams/HRO’s breach, there is a reasonable likelihood USA Power would have won
the RFP and been awarded a long term power purchase contract.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE LEGAL
STANDARDS GOVERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
As a general and broad sweeping error underlying the district court’s entire ruling, the
district court erroneously applied summary judgment standards.  First, the district court
erroneously deemed admitted virtually all PacifiCorp’s statements of purportedly undisputed
facts when USA Power, in compliance with Rule 7, directly disputed those facts by
explaining the basis of its dispute and providing supporting record cites.  Second, the district
court erroneously failed to draw all reasonable inferences concerning issues of material fact
in USA Power’s favor.  Third, the district court erroneously made credibility determinations
and weighed evidence in favor of PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO, disregarding USA Power’s
admissible evidence as “speculative.”
A. The District Court Erroneously Applied Rule 7.
Under Rule 7, to dispute a summary judgment movant’s purported statement of fact,
the non-movant must include in its opposition memorandum:  (1) a “verbatim restatement
of each of the moving party’s facts that is controverted;” (2) an “explanation of the grounds
for any dispute;” and (3) “citation to relevant materials” in support of the dispute.  Utah R.
Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B).  The requisite explanation of the dispute is satisfied when a party
identifies the evidence necessary to facilitate the district court’s assessment of genuine issues
of fact for trial.  Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994).  Only
  See Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 130, ¶ 50, 63 P.3d 705 (finding failure to41
controvert where plaintiff failed to discuss defendant’s argument or supporting facts in its
opposition to summary judgment).
  See Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, ¶¶ 10-11, 156 P.3d 175 (upholding district42
court’s finding of failure to controvert because defendants “did not include a coherent
explanation of the grounds for the dispute as required,” and largely failed to provide any
supporting citations); Fannen v. Lehi City, 2005 UT App 301, n.1, 2005 WL 1530517, at *1,
n.1 (upholding deemed admission of facts where plaintiff did not respond to defendant’s
motion for summary judgment).
  See Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, ¶ 7, 77 P.3d 339 (finding failure to controvert43
where plaintiff “did not refer to Defendants’ statements of uncontroverted facts, but instead
included only his own statement of undisputed facts.  As a result, it was unclear what facts
[plaintiff] contended were disputed.”).
  See Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., 2003 UT 23, ¶ 41, 70 P.3d 904 (plaintiff44
“did not provide any evidence to contradict or rebut the properly supported fact in
[defendant’s] motion for summary judgment . . . .”).
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when a nonmovant fails to controvert a statement in this manner will a statement properly
be deemed admitted.  Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A).  Indeed, as applied in Utah, a statement has
been held to not have been controverted only in the clearest cases, such as when a nonmovant
wholly fails to respond to a movant’s statement,  does not explain the dispute,  does not41 42
even refer to the movant’s statement of uncontroverted facts,  or provides no evidence or43
citation to any evidence.  44
Not one of these deficiencies is present in this case.  USA Power quoted verbatim each
of PacifiCorp’s statements, explained the grounds for its dispute, and provided citation to
admissible supporting evidence.  (R5913-35)  USA Power also presented additional disputed
and undisputed statements of material fact (“Disputed and Undisputed Facts”), by numbered
paragraph with record citation, in accordance with Rule 7(c)(3)(B), further demonstrating
genuine issues of material fact that must be decided by the jury.  (R5935-64)  Consequently,
USA Power complied with Rule 7, and the court’s contrary ruling was error. 
  The district court gave no indication of what was required to “specifically” controvert a45
fact separate and apart from the explanation of the grounds of a dispute as actually required
by Rule 7, nor upon what authority it relied to impose such a requirement.  The district court
appears to have borrowed this language from PacifiCorp.  Although PacifiCorp cited to Rule
7(c)(3)(A) as the basis for this quote (R6679), in actuality Rule 7(c)(3)(A) has never
contained any requirement that a statement of fact be deemed admitted if not “specifically”
controverted.
  In some instances, PacifiCorp expressly, rather than implicitly, included self-serving46
nonfactual assertions and inferences in its statements of fact, including in Paragraphs 1, 2,
4, 5, 7, 8, 16, 17, 22, 23, and 25.  (R8560-71)
For example, in paragraph 2, PacifiCorp stated its characterization of Mona as “ideal
for a combined cycle plant.”  (R8561)  Using the term “ideal,” played into PacifiCorp’s
argument that USA Power’s analyses of the feasibility of siting a plant in Mona were not
valuable because Mona was an obvious location for a power plant.  USA Power responded
to paragraph 2, without contesting the undisputed portions of the paragraph (i.e., that (1)
Panda secured options to purchase land; (2) natural gas pipelines existed in Mona; and (3)
the substation was in Mona).  USA Power did, however, dispute the inference that the Mona
site was an “ideal” and, therefore, obvious and cited to extensive evidence to that effect,
including that in September 2003 PacifiCorp was skeptical of the suitability of Mona as a
power plant site (R2114) and that Mona’s temperate climate and scarcity of water created
obstacles for a power plant developer in (a) obtaining sufficient water rights to use traditional
wet-cooling methods, or (b) determining whether dry-cooling methods would be
economically feasible in Mona’s high-altitude, temperate conditions (R3705-09, 2050-52).
(R5914)  Nonetheless, the district court ruled USA Power failed to “specifically controvert”
Paragraph 2, and deemed it admitted in its entirety, including PacifiCorp’s disputed
inferences and argument that Mona was an ideal (obvious) site.  (R7603-04)
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The district court’s conclusion that USA Power improperly “argu[ed] about the
implication of the facts asserted instead of ‘specifically controverting’ them with the factual
record” in violation of Rule 7 is erroneous.  Rule 7 does not require the nonmovant to
“specifically controvert” the movant’s statement of facts.   Rule 7 only requires the non-45
movant to dispute the statement of fact, with explanation and evidentiary support, which is
what USA Power did. 
Moreover, even to the extent some of Pacificorp’s statements only contained “facts”
in the true sense of the word,  it was nonetheless proper under Rule 7 for USA Power to46
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explain its dispute of the inferences PacifiCorp implicitly sought drawn in its favor based on
those facts.  This is true because, even where a particular fact may be undisputed, a genuine
issue of material fact exists when the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that particular
fact are disputed.  Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. Co. v. 51-SPR-L.L.C., 2008 UT 28, ¶¶ 17, 21,
183 P.3d 248; Wasatch Oil & Gas, L.L.C. v. Reott, 2007 UT App 223, ¶¶ 31, 35, 163 P.3d
713.  USA Power had no choice but to identify and dispute the inferences PacifiCorp sought
drawn from particular undisputed fact, or risk those inferences being deemed admitted as
undisputed fact.
 For example, in Paragraph 13, to support the inference that the Spring Canyon project
did not consist of any confidential information, PacifiCorp stated that Spring Canyon’s
public air permit application (entitled a “Notice of Intent” or “NOI”) “laid out many of the
details of [Spring Canyon],” and listed some disclosed elements.  (R8565-66 (emphasis
added))  In compliance with Rule 7, USA Power responded by expressly stating that
Paragraph 13 was “[n]ot disputed, except for the material omissions,” and listed eleven of
the confidential elements of Spring Canyon neither disclosed by the NOI nor identified in
Paragraph 13, with citation to supporting evidence.  (R5924-26)  These omitted facts were
also set forth in detail and with record citations in USA Power’s Disputed and Undisputed
Facts.  (R5940-48, 5952-53, 5963)  USA Power, therefore, presented evidence that all its
confidential information had not been publicly disclosed, which directly disputed the
inference that PacifiCorp sought the district court to draw from Paragraph 13.   
Despite USA Power’s compliance with Rule 7, the district court deemed Paragraph 13
admitted, ruling that the “undisputed material facts demonstrate that plaintiffs’ concept,
  Notably, such a ruling is internally inconsistent with facts that the district court did not47
deem admitted.  In its dispute of PacifiCorp’s paragraph 14, which the district court did not
deem admitted, USA Power expressly stated, with supporting citations, that the “details”
disclosed by USA Power’s application for an air permit were not “laid out with sufficient
specificity to permit any reverse engineering of the plant.  Nor did the description show the
technical feasibility or financial viability of the project.”  (R5926)  Nonetheless, regarding
Paragraph 13, the district court ruled that all USA Power’s confidential information was part
of the public record based on PacifiCorp’s identification of USA Power’s “public filings and
application for an air permit.”  (R7605)
  Significantly, the district court drew this inference even though PacifiCorp did not provide48
an evidentiary basis to establish anything other than what was expressly described in
Paragraph 13. 
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vision and claimed confidential information were of public record, and were disclosed to
PacifiCorp by the public record.”   (R7605)  Thus, the district court improperly drew in47
PacifiCorp’s favor the exact inference USA Power expressly disputed, because the district
court ruled that all USA Power’s confidential information, not just the information described
in Paragraph 13, was disclosed to the public.   Ellsworth, 2008 UT 28, ¶¶ 17, 21; Wasatch48
Oil, 2007 UT App 223, ¶¶ 31, 35. 
Similarly, in Paragraph 20, to support its argument that Panda, not Spring Canyon, was
the foundation of Currant Creek, PacifiCorp stated:  “PacifiCorp utilized the project assets
that Panda had started assembling in late 2000 and early 2001, . . . to . . . construct the
Currant Creek power plant on the Panda site.”  (R8567-68)  In response, USA Power
disputed the inference that the limited assets PacifiCorp may have utilized would, by
themselves, have enabled PacifiCorp to develop Currant Creek without utilizing USA
Power’s trade secret:
The only value acquired from Panda was the land options and the Met data.  See
Response to paragraphs 3, 4 and 7. . . . Currant Creek [] was a much different
resource based upon size and cooling technology [Exs. 10, 294; Koltick Rpt at
18 (Ex. 429)  In fact, PacifiCorp did not submit an NOI for Currant Creek until
  In addition, USA Power, in its Disputed and Undisputed Facts, detailed the facts49
demonstrating why Panda was not the foundation for Currant Creek, including that (1) Panda
had concluded a dry-cooled plant was not economically feasible in Mona; (2) Panda’s plant
was a 1000 MW plant that was wet, not dry, cooled; and (3) Panda had no air permit, water
rights, transmission agreement, site-specific preliminary engineering showing the feasibility
of a dry-cooled plant, or cost studies or proformas showing the financial viability of a 2x1
combined cycle, air cooled, 550 MW plant in Mona, Utah.  (R4608, 4616, 5918-19, 5950-52)
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August 2003, six months after it purchased Panda’s assets and well after it had
obtained USA Power’s confidential information. [Ex. 4]  (R5929)  49
Despite USA Power’s explanation of, and record support for, its dispute of Paragraph
20, the district court deemed paragraph 20 admitted, ruling that Panda’s assets were “pivotal
to PacifiCorp’s development of Currant Creek” (R7604), and “the design, engineering and
construction of the Currant Creek Power Plant was not based upon nor utilized any
information from or about [USA Power].”  (R7605)  In doing so, the district court again
improperly drew the exact inference in favor of PacifiCorp which USA Power disputed.
Ellsworth, 2008 UT 28, ¶¶ 17, 21; Wasatch Oil, 2007 UT App 223, ¶¶ 31, 35.
The district court repeated this pattern of deeming facts and adverse inferences
admitted regarding PacifiCorp’s statements 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29.  The court erroneously did so although USA Power, with respect
to each of those paragraphs, explained the dispute, cited admissible supporting evidence and,
in addition, provided specific facts in its Disputed and Undisputed Facts, showing genuine
issues of material fact on each of the critical issues the court found in favor of PacifiCorp.
As such, this Court should reverse summary judgment on all USA Power’s claims.
B. The District Court Erroneously Weighed Evidence and Failed to Draw
Reasonable Inferences in USA Power’s Favor.
 
On summary judgment, a court must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence
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in the non-movant’s favor.  Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 625 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).  A court must even draw reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor based
on otherwise undisputed facts if more than one plausible but conflicting inference can be
drawn from that fact and other evidence presented.  Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2008
UT 15, ¶ 19, 179 P.3d 786; Ellsworth, 2008 UT 28, ¶ 21; Wasatch Oil, 2007 UT App 223,
¶¶ 31, 35; see 10A Charles A. Wright, et al., Fed. Practice & Proc. § 2725 (3d ed. Westlaw
2008) (summary judgment not proper “merely because the facts [movant] offers appear more
plausible than those tendered in opposition”).  Such conflicting inferences give rise to a
genuine issue of material fact, precluding summary judgment.  Uintah Basin, 2008 UT 15,
¶ 19; Ellsworth, 2008 UT 28, ¶¶ 19-21.  It is only when the nonmovant fails to present any
evidence to refute a factual inference in favor of the movant that a court may grant summary
judgment.  Ellsworth, 2008 UT 28, ¶ 19.
On summary judgment, a court likewise cannot weigh the parties’ evidence.  Webster
v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983); Wasatch Oil, 2007 UT App 223, ¶ 35.  A court
improperly engages in evidence weighing if, for example, it considers the persuasiveness of
one plausible inference versus another, even if those inferences are based on undisputed fact,
Wasatch Oil, 2007 UT App 223, ¶ 35, or if it determines the nonmovant’s evidence is
speculative absent an evidentiary ruling that such evidence is inadmissible.  See Fairview
Hosp. & Health Care Servs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 535 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn.
1995) (en banc).  The latter is true because a non-evidentiary determination that such
evidence is speculative is tantamount to a determination it is not credible.  Id.
Here, USA Power presented admissible evidence that directly contradicted many of the
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inferences PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO sought drawn in their favor from their purported
statements of undisputed fact, requiring the district court to hold that genuine issues of
material fact existed as to the inferences to be drawn from those facts.  Ellsworth, 2008 UT
28, ¶ 19.  However, contrary to Utah law, the district court compared the parties’ conflicting
evidence and consistently concluded that USA Power’s admissible evidence and the plausible
inferences based thereon were not persuasive or credible when compared to PacifiCorp’s and
Williams/HRO’s statements of undisputed fact.
For example, PacifiCorp urged the district court to draw the inference that Currant
Creek was entirely the product of PacifiCorp and Shaw’s independent efforts, and, therefore,
not misappropriated from USA Power, based on the purported undisputed fact in Paragraph
21 that “Currant Creek was designed, engineered and constructed for PacifiCorp by
Shaw/Stone & Webster.”  (R8568)  USA Power disputed this with evidence showing neither
PacifiCorp nor Shaw conducted the preliminary design steps of site-specific feasibility
studies, without which such a power project cannot be sited and developed.  (R5929-30)  In
addition, USA Power detailed facts giving rise to the reasonable inference that PacifiCorp
did indeed misappropriate its confidential information to develop Currant Creek, including
that (1) PacifiCorp decided to develop Currant Creek and committed millions of dollars to
its development before it ever hired Shaw (R3730-33, 4824-26, 4846, 5016); (2) Shaw did
not perform the critical tasks that are done prior to selection of a site and plant configuration,
such as calculating the site-specific energy penalty for a dry-cooled plant or creating a
detailed water balance test until after PacifiCorp made the decision to develop a dry-cooled
plant in Mona and after PacifiCorp had USA Power’s confidential information (R3707-09,
  Despite the evidence, including expert opinion, that PacifiCorp could not have determined50
to develop a 550 MW plant in Mona and designed it as a dry-cooled plant in the four months
it had to submit a bid and without conducting the critical testing which was not performed
by it or Shaw before all decisions were made and put in motion, the district court disregarded
that evidence and inference and found in PacifiCorp’s favor by ruling:  “Plaintiffs’ argument
that PacifiCorp could not have developed Currant Creek in four months without use of their
trade secrets, that PacifiCorp did not test for dry-cooling and therefore could not have made
the decision to go with dry-cooling until reviewing their claimed dry-cooling trade secrets
is nothing more than argument, opinion and theory.”  (R7609)
  The district court also improperly ruled that it could not draw the inference in USA51
Power’s favor that PacifiCorp misappropriated USA Power’s trade secret from the facts
PacifiCorp had access to the confidential information and the similarity of Spring Canyon
and Current Creek “because the undisputed facts establish the design development,
construction, location and component parts and their arrangement are not secret, are all well
known in the industry and the similarities can be found in almost every combined cycle
51
4128-32, 6993-7000); (3) PacifiCorp did not hire Shaw until four months before the RFP bid
was due when it takes 18-24 months to develop a power plant project such as Currant Creek
(R3729-32);  (4) the Apex Plant is not located in Mona, Utah or anywhere near Mona, Utah
and its site-specific modeling and evaluations have no application to Mona (R4827-28; 2102-
05, 3705-09); (5) PacifiCorp itself did not have the experience or knowledge to develop a
combined cycle dry-cooled plant such as Currant Creek (R3707, 3729-32, 4699-702); (6)
PacifiCorp was motivated to issue an RFP and misappropriate USA Power’s confidential
information to win the RFP (R3678-79, 3801-02, 3331); and (7) PacifiCorp concealed its
misappropriation (R4802-03, 4799-800).50
USA Power’s evidence, and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom,
created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Currant Creek was entirely the product
of PacifiCorp and Shaw’s independent efforts and not misappropriated from USA Power.
However, the district court ruled it was undisputed that “the Currant Creek Power Plant
represents PacifiCorp’s and Shaw/Stone & Webster’s own work.”  (R7604)   Stated another51
power plant built in the industry.”  (R7609 (emphasis added))  This was erroneous because
the district court disregarded USA Power’s facts disputing that conclusion.
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way, the district court ruled not only that PacifiCorp’s statement of fact was undisputed, but
also that the inference to be drawn therefrom was undisputed as well, despite USA Power
having “present[ed] evidence to refute the inference.”  Ellsworth, 2008 UT 28, ¶ 19. 
Indeed, the only way the district court could rule the absence of misappropriation was
undisputed was to wholly disregard USA Power’s contrary evidence, which the court did by
labeling USA Power’s evidence as speculative.  Specifically, the court ruled USA Power’s
evidence of misappropriation, a portion of which the district court set out in the better part
of three pages of its ruling, was “a stretch,” “nothing more than argument, opinion and
theory,” and “pure speculation” and “conjecture” in light of the undisputed facts.  (R7607-11)
The district court’s determination that USA Power’s evidence of misappropriation was
speculative was an improper determination regarding the credibility of that evidence, not an
evidentiary determination that such evidence was inadmissible.  Fairview Hosp., 535 N.W.2d
at 341; see also Shaw Res. Ltd. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 2006 UT App. 313, ¶ 67,
142 P.3d 560 (Bench, J., dissenting) (“the main opinion holds that . . . the disputed facts are
merely speculative or conjectural.  I respectfully suggest that, in so holding, my colleagues
have engaged in the process of weighing the evidence.”).  Indeed, the district court did not
rule any evidence preferred by USA Power was inadmissible, denied a motion to strike some
of that evidence, and, there being no cross-appeal filed, there is no question on appeal as to
the admissibility of any of USA Power’s evidence.
In sum, USA Power presented admissible evidence from which the jury could
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reasonably infer, not speculate, that PacifiCorp misappropriated USA Power’s trade secret.
See Scott v. HK Contractors, 2008 UT App 370, ¶¶ 17, 26, __ P.3d __ (reversing summary
judgment where plaintiff presented evidence from which jury could infer, rather than
speculate, causation of plaintiff’s injuries).  Based on that evidence, the district court should
have allowed USA Power the opportunity to present its case to the jury and allow the jury to
draw its own conclusions.  Id. at ¶ 16. 
Instead, the district court continually rejected USA Power’s evidence, and the plausible
inferences to be drawn therefrom in USA Power’s favor, as speculative, finding no triable
issues of fact on at least one essential element of each of USA Power’s claims.  (R7603-21)
By simply discrediting USA Power’s evidence and inferences that contradicted the
“undisputed” facts, rather than ruling such evidence and inferences created genuine issues
of material fact for trial, the district court erroneously weighed the persuasiveness of such
evidence and inferences to grant summary judgment against USA Power on all its claims.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the grant of summary judgment.
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT’S GRANT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON USA POWER’S TRADE SECRET AND
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT
ERRED IN RULING USA POWER’S CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION WAS
NOT A TRADE SECRET USED BY PACIFICORP.
To recover under the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act, USA Power only needs to
present evidence supporting:  (1) the existence of USA Power’s trade secret; (2) USA
Power’s communication of that trade secret to PacifiCorp under an obligation that PacifiCorp
not use or disclose it; and (3) PacifiCorp’s misappropriation of the trade secret.  See Utah
Code Ann. § 13-24-2; Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 505 F. Supp. 2d
  The law protects trade secrets against misappropriation by another “as a means to52
encourage investment in research by providing an opportunity to capture the returns from
successful innovations.”  Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. a (1995).
Absent this protection in the law, there would not have been the same incentive for USA
Power to develop Spring Canyon.  PacifiCorp, in turn, would not have been in a position to
construct a plant necessary to meet its 2005 power need, would have been required to
purchase power from independent sources and, therefore, would have incurred the additional
cost (likely passed on to Utah rate payers) of “$20-$40 million per year.”  (R10016-17)
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1178, 1184 (D. Utah 2007).   Here, the district court erred in finding that USA Power failed52
to show issues of fact on the first and third elements of the trade secret claim and regarding
PacifiCorp’s use of confidential information in breach of the Confidentiality Agreement.
A. The District Court Erred in Ruling USA Power Failed to Establish the
Existence of a Trade Secret Because USA Power Presented Evidence of its
Trade Secret on This Fact Intensive Issue and The District Court Focused
Exclusively on Whether Each Individual Constituent Element, Rather
Than the Compilation, Was Known or Generally Ascertainable.
USA Power set forth in detail, by paragraph and with citation, the information that
constitutes its trade secret.  That information is more than sufficient for a jury to find USA
Power had a trade secret as defined by the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the “Act”).
USA Power’s trade secret is the collection of modeling, studies, evaluations, testing,
end results, and conclusions that USA Power spent almost two years and millions of dollars
performing and compiling, which demonstrated that, on a site-specific basis, a 550 MW plant
designed as an air (not water) cooled, gas-fired, combined-cycle plant in a 2 x 1 configuration
with GE F7A turbines, duct firing, and zero discharge technology was both technologically
viable and economically feasible at Mona, Utah.  The totality of the development work,
conclusions and results which formed USA Power’s trade secret were shared with PacifiCorp
pursuant to a Confidentiality Agreement from September 11, 2002 to March 2003.  (R2091-
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122, 2621-24)  The confidential data included confidentially designated Volumes I-III
(R10127-291, 9848-10007, 10011-90) and written and oral information, including Ray
Racine’s letter of October 29, 2002.  (R5155-56)  USA Power’s trade secret disclosed to
PacifiCorp includes the site-specific modeling and performance curves developed by USA
Power’s engineer, which demonstrated the output for a dry-cooled 550 MW plant at the
altitude, ambient air temperatures and water supply in Mona.  The research by USA Power
and its engineer showed that dry cooling was feasible based on the specific findings
regarding the cost and despite the loss of efficiency of using dry cooling versus wet cooling.
(R3705-06, 4666-79, 4956-58, 10135-37)  The trade secret included the water table tests
performed by Racine.  (R4950, 4952-54, 4676-79)  USA Power’s trade secret also included
the market and itemized cost analysis that showed the first in the queue position at the Mona
substation gave USA Power access to lucrative markets for which there were no planned or
existing plants for the new power requirements.  (R2171-72, 3721-25, 4560-62, 10041-90)
The trade secret included proforma financial information representing years of work in
assessing costs and estimating profitability.  (R2187)
USA Power’s expensive and time consuming work and resulting information was not
off-the-shelf information or information that could be simply superimposed from another
facility, such as Apex, located in a different area with different site conditions.  (R3705-09,
2102-05, 6312-13)
USA Power’s trade secret fits squarely within the definition of a trade secret under the
Utah Uniform Trade Secret Act, which defines a trade secret as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
    See, e.g., Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184-1187 (D. Utah 2007);53
Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 494 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also Harvey
Barnett, Inc. v. Shilder, 338 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Trade secret status is a
question of fact.”) (applying Colo. adopted Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
  Cases from other jurisdictions that have also adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act are54
persuasive authority in Utah.  See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1360 (Utah 1993)
(interpreting Utah Uniform Securities Act and stating adoption of uniform law in Utah
includes a “mandate” to follow majority rule of other jurisdictions that have adopted the
uniform law.)
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technique, or process, that:
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2 (West 2004).  
First, the existence of a trade secret is a factually complex question that should be
decided by a jury; it should not normally be decided as a matter of law on summary
judgment.   Indeed, “a ‘trade secret’ is one of the most elusive and difficult concepts in the53
law to define.”  Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 723 (7th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir.
1978)).   “For this reason, the question of whether certain information constitutes a trade54
secret ordinarily is best resolved by a fact finder after full presentation of evidence from each
side.”  Id. (quoting Lear Siegler, 569 F.2d at 289).
In this case, the issue of the existence of a trade secret should have proceeded to trial.
USA Power presented substantial evidence that its trade secret provided to PacifiCorp,
pursuant to the Confidentiality Agreement, derived independent economic value from not
being generally known or readily ascertainable to PacifiCorp.  That evidence included the
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following facts:  (1) it took USA Power’s engineers nearly two years to shape the essential
nature of Spring Canyon through evaluating various plant configurations and characteristics
to find the most successful combination of attributes, including feasibility of dry cooling, the
size and design of the turbines and their configuration, the size of the plant, the site for the
plant, and the amount of required water (R1970, 2051-55, 2105, 3724-25, 4666-79, 10135-
37, 10203-21); (2) it took USA Power over two years to compile the financial information
and proformas showing Spring Canyon was financially viable (R2187); (3) PacifiCorp had
never developed, designed or built a dry-cooled or combined-cycle project in Utah, and
PacifiCorp’s development team, led by Thurgood, had never developed a combined-cycle
power project (R2141-43, 2153, 3707, 3730, 4699-702); (4) USA Power’s work, evaluation,
modeling, testing and the results of that work were never revealed to the public (R2102-13,
3726-30, 8167 at 243-45); (5) PacifiCorp admitted that USA Power’s air permit application
by itself did not contain enough information to even determine the validity of the project
(R6382-83); (6) PacifiCorp, after USA Power filed its application for an air permit, signed
a Confidentiality Agreement to gain access to USA Power’s trade secret (R2621-24); (7)
PacifiCorp, after USA Power filed its application for an air permit and water change
application, and agreed to pay $3 million for the Spring Canyon project plus execute a Joint
Development Agreement with the principals (R2210-13, 4564-68, 3258-61, 10401); (8)
PacifiCorp, after USA Power filed its application for an air permit and water change
application, admitted that Spring Canyon was the only viable option to meet the projected
power shortage in 2005 (R10398); (9) PacifiCorp, when it approved the purchase of Panda,
admitted Spring Canyon was the only viable option to meet the 2005 deadline (R10396-403);
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(10) PacifiCorp admitted that USA Power’s work and results provided “a competitive
advantage that would take PacifiCorp two to three years and several million dollars to
duplicate”  (R2116-17); (11) PacifiCorp was under a 4-month deadline to submit a bid for
a competing project at the Mona site when it generally took 18-24 months and millions of
dollars to complete such a development, particularly considering the elevation, water
availability and ambient temperatures of Mona (R2050-55, 2103, 2116-17, 3704-09,
3721-23, 3729-31, 4666, 4670, 4748, 9244, 10260, 10275-80, 10392); (12) PacifiCorp hired
Shaw, and Shaw did not perform any performance evaluations until well after PacifiCorp
made the decision to site Current Creek as a dry-cooled plant at Mona, after PacifiCorp had
USA Power’s confidential information and one month before the RFP bid was due (R4128-
32, 4518-20); (13) the Apex Plant is not located in Mona, Utah or anywhere near Mona, Utah
and its site-specific modeling and evaluations have no application to Mona (R4827-28; 2102-
05, 3705-09); (14) the only assets of any value PacifiCorp acquired from Panda were land
options and met data  (R2264, 4710-20, 4728-29, 5471, 10400), and Panda had determined
an air cooled plant at Mona was not economically feasible (R4608-09, 4616, 8615-16); and
(15) a second power plant of Spring Canyon’s size would not be economically viable or
technically feasible in Mona (R2328, 2866, 3723, 3786-88, 2045-48, 3643, 6448).
Second, the district court erroneously focused on whether each individual, constituent
element of the Spring Canyon project was known or readily ascertainable in the industry,
rather than the overall combination itself.  Under the statute, compilations, formulas,
processes, and patterns can be trade secrets so long as the combination itself derives
economic value from not being readily ascertainable by others through proper means and is
  As the Tenth Circuit has held “a trade secret can include a system where the elements are55
in the public domain but there has been accomplished an effective, successful and valuable
integration of the public domain elements and the trade secret gave the claimant a
competitive advantage.”  Rivendell, 28 F.3d at 1046; Harvey Barnett, 338 F.3d at 1130
(reversing summary judgment due to issues of fact); see DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp., 479
F. Supp. 2d 68, 78 (D.D.C. 2007) (“The ability to combine these elements into a successful
. . . process, like the creation of a recipe from common cooking ingredients is a trade secret
entitled to protection.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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subject to reasonable efforts to keep it secret.  Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(4) (“‘Trade secret’
means information, including a . . . compilation . . . .”); see Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 28 F.3d 1042, 1045 (10th Cir. 1994) (reversing summary judgment
on trade secret claim and holding it is error to examine whether the elements of a system,
rather than the “system as a whole,” was trade secret).
A confidential combination remains a trade secret even if some of its constituent parts
are generally known.  For example, “[t]he complete formula for Coca-Cola is one of the best-
kept trade secrets in the world,” even though “most of the ingredients are public knowledge
. . . .”  Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289 (D. Del. 1985).
In fact, a trade secret can consist entirely of publicly known constituent elements.  55
Here, the district court erred because it ignored whether the combination created by
USA Power was a trade secret, and evaluated only whether some parts of that combination
were known or readily ascertainable.  (R7608-11, 8167 at 220-23)  By basing its decision on
an analysis of Spring Canyon’s constituent elements, rather than the project as a whole (and,
as previously described, finding it was undisputed some of those elements were known or
ascertainable when there is evidence to the contrary), the district court erroneously concluded
USA Power presented insufficient evidence of its trade secret.  (R7605-11)
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Third, the district court erroneously disregarded the aspects of USA Power’s trade
secret on the basis they might have been eventually ascertained by PacifiCorp without regard
to the time restraints of this case.  (R7606, 7610-11)  It is one thing to eventually ascertain
details of USA Power’s Spring Canyon project; it is quite another thing to pull that
information together in time to build a dry-cooled, combined-cycle power plant in Mona that
must be on-line by April 2005.  USA Power presented credible evidence that, because the
time frame to complete a project eligible to compete for the RFP contract was so short,
PacifiCorp could not have independently replicated USA Power’s feasibility studies in time,
and hence, could only obtain the information by purchasing Spring Canyon or the improper
means of theft.  See supra, Statement of Facts (“SOF”), Part IX.
Finally, the district court completely failed to account for PacifiCorp’s admission that
it received non-public “confidential information” from USA Power regarding the Spring
Canyon Project.  After PacifiCorp obtained USA Power’s air permit application, it signed
the Confidentiality Agreement on September 11, 2002, in which it agreed that PacifiCorp
“will be receiving, reviewing and analyzing information with respect to the Potential
Transaction that is confidential, proprietary, or otherwise not publically available.”
(R2621 (emphasis added))  The district court did not examine or explain that written
admission even though it, alone, negates PacifiCorp’s argument that the Spring Canyon
information USA Power shared was readily ascertainable from public sources.
B. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment When USA
Power Presented Sufficient Evidence From Which a Jury Could Infer the
Fact of Misappropriation.
USA Power presented circumstantial evidence from which a jury could find that
  This Court has also, implicitly, recognized the possibility of using circumstantial evidence56
in this manner to prove misappropriation.  See Hammerton, Inc. v. Heisterman, No. 2:06-CV-
00806 TS, 2008 WL 2004327, at *10 (D. Utah May 9, 2008) (noting Utah Supreme Court
in Water & Energy Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 974 P.2d 821 (Utah 1999), “implicitly recognized
the possibility of using circumstantial evidence to prove misappropriation”).
  See, e.g., Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 285 F.3d 1353, 1361-62 (Fed.57
Cir. 2002); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587, 596 (7th Cir. 2001); Sokol,
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PacifiCorp misappropriated USA Power’s trade secret.  
A defendant misappropriates a trade secret when it uses or discloses another’s trade
secret without express or implied consent.  Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(2).  As the lower court
acknowledged, there will rarely be a “smoking gun” in cases of trade secret misappropriation
because “any direct evidence on this point would . . . be firmly in the defendant's control.”
Sokol Crystal Prods., Inc. v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 15 F.3d 1427, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994).  As
such, “requiring direct evidence would foreclose most trade-secret claims from reaching the
jury because corporations rarely keep direct evidence of their use ready for another party to
discover.”  Stratienko v. Cordis Corp., 429 F.3d 592, 601 (6th Cir. 2005).
While this Court has not directly addressed the issue, it should expressly adopt the rule
implemented by many other jurisdictions, including the United States District Court for Utah,
that a plaintiff/nonmovant must show only evidence of the defendant/movant’s access to the
trade secret and similarity in the product or design to survive summary judgment on the issue
of misappropriation.   Stratienko, 429 F.3d at 600 (noting, in addition to the Sixth Circuit,56
standard has been adopted by the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal
Circuits); accord Hammerton, No. 2:06-CV-00806 TS, 2008 WL 2004327, at *9 (applying
access and similarity rule to Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act, noting “courts generally allow
the use of circumstantial evidence to prove misappropriation of trade secrets”).57
15 F.3d at 1432.
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Here, although the district court correctly stated circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation could be used to withstand summary judgment, it reached the wrong
conclusion that a jury could not infer misappropriation from access and similarity.  It is
undisputed that PacifiCorp had access to USA Power’s trade secret information.  (See
R6283, 9848-10007, 10011-10090, 10127-10291)  USA Power also presented substantial
evidence of the similarity between Currant Creek and Spring Canyon, including the opinions
of multiple experts that the two projects were materially identical, and PacifiCorp’s own
admission to USA Power that “we learned a lot from you guys.”  (R2303-04, 3733, 3784)
For example, PacifiCorp’s Currant Creek plant is (1) located immediately adjacent to the
Mona Substation right next to the site USA Power selected for the Spring Canyon
development.  The projects are “the same in all material aspects,” including but not limited
to:  (2) dry cooling; (3) zero wastewater discharge; (4) natural gas source is Questar’s
Mainline 104; (5) same fuel transmission path; (6) same interconnection at the Mona
Substation; (7) same voltage for interconnect at 345 kV; (8) same capacity steam turbine
generator; (9) gas combustion turbines are GE Class 7FA frame-type; (10) “two on one”
combined cycle configuration; (11) each gas turbine’s nominal rated capacity is 140 MW;
(12) additional duct burner capacity is approximately the same; (13) total plant capacity is
approximately the same; and (14) both projects used the same attorney and law firm.  (See,
e.g., R3733, 2293-302, 2732-34, 3025-27, supra, SOF, Part IX)  Further, USA Power
presented evidence that PacifiCorp’s development of Currant Creek in four months would
not have been possible without misappropriating USA Power’s trade secret.  (R3724-25,
  A defendant’s development of a similar project in a greatly expedited pace and at a greatly58
reduced cost further supports the inference that the defendant has misappropriated a
plaintiff’s trade secret.  See, e.g., Pribyl, 259 F.3d at 596; Rivendell, 28 F.3d at 1046;
Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, 358 N.E.2d 804 (Mass. 1976).
  Cf. Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Quest Software Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 688, 696 (N.D. Ill.59
2004) (stating defendants’ access to trade secret software source code “acted as a guide . . .
to develop a competing product [which] alone, even without actual copying, likely rises to
the level of misappropriation”).
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3729-32, supra, SOF, Part IX at 36)58
Moreover, the level of similarity shown need only be sufficient to support a reasonable
inference that a trade secret was used.  In Hammerton, an employee received a copy of his
employer’s customer list shortly before leaving the company.  2008 WL 2004327, at *2.  The
former employee formed his own company and began manufacturing products, which
competed in the same small but lucrative market; his former employer filed suit claiming,
inter alia, misappropriation of its trade secret customer list.  Id. at *1.  The court ruled there
were issues of  material fact regarding whether the employee misappropriated his former
employer’s customer list, precluding summary judgment, even where only 27% of the
customers on the employee’s new list were also on the plaintiff’s list.  Id. at *10.  Here, USA
Power has presented evidence well in excess of the similarity in Hammerton.59
Finally, even if this Court does not adopt the two part test for determining
misappropriation – access and similarity, USA Power presented additional compelling
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation requiring a jury to decide the issue, including:
1. PacifiCorp did not have the experience or knowledge to develop Currant Creek:
(a)  PacifiCorp had no prior experience developing a dry-cooled plant in Utah, and its
development team had no experience in developing a combined-cycle power plant of any
  R3707-09, 3730-32, 4518-20, 4844-45, 4831-32, 5379-91, 3721-23, 6312-13, 3705-06,60
2102-05, 8167 at 239-40, 9159, 10401-02; see supra, SOF, Part IX
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type (R3707, 3729-32, 4699-702);  (b) PacifiCorp did not complete the critical tasks that are
done prior to selection of a site and plant configuration such as calculating the site-specific
energy penalty for developing a dry-cooled plant or creating a detailed water balance test
until after PacifiCorp made the decision to develop a dry-cooled plant in Mona, after it had
committed millions of dollars to its development, after it had rejected all site alternatives, and
after PacifiCorp had USA Power’s trade secret;  (c)  PacifiCorp did not acquire the assets60
from Panda that would have enabled it to develop a combined-cycle, dry-cooled power plant
such as Currant Creek; Panda was a 1,000 MW wet – not dry – cooled power plant that had
no water rights, air permit, site specific testing for a dry-cooled power plant, zoning variance
or any other critical elements for the development of what became Currant Creek (R4602;
see supra, SOF, Part II);  (d)  PacifiCorp made the decision to develop Currant Creek and
was moving forward with its development before it hired Shaw, and Shaw did not perform
any critical testing, evaluating or modeling until after PacifiCorp made the decision to
develop in Mona and use dry cooling (R3730-33, 4824-26, 4962, 4846, 5016);  (e)  48 hours
after receiving USA Power’s confidential proforma information demonstrating the economic
feasibility of Spring Canyon and taking detailed notes of the information,  PacifiCorp issued
a directive that, in hiring an engineer for Currant Creek, “to stress dry cooling experience”
and “experience with inlet chillers on F Class machines,” both of which were key and unique
characteristics of Spring Canyon (R5012; 2172-73, 4559-61, 4841-42, 10129); and (f)
PacifiCorp admitted it “learned a lot” from USA Power after the RFP process had concluded
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(R2303-4).
2. PacifiCorp developed Currant Creek in an unrealistic time period:  (a)  a power
plant project such as Currant Creek takes 18 to 24 months to develop, yet PacifiCorp
developed its project and submitted its RFP bid within four months (R3729-32); (b)
PacifiCorp admitted in September 2002 that USA Power had a 2-3 year competitive
advantage over PacifiCorp (R2116); and (c) in January and February 2003, PacifiCorp
identified Spring Canyon as the only viable project that could meet an on line date of April
2005 to meet its projected power shortage (R10391-403).
3. PacifiCorp was motivated to issue an RFP and misappropriate USA Power’s
trade secret to win the RFP: PacifiCorp was pressured by the Utah Public Service
Commission to develop and build its own power plant in Utah (R3331, 3678-79, 3801-02),
pressured by its shareholder, Scottish Power, to get a higher return on its investment from the
Utah Public Service Commission by developing and constructing its own power plant (id.),
and Rand Thurgood was personally motivated not to have another company develop a power
plant project in PacifiCorp’s backyard.  (R2115, 2303) 
4. PacifiCorp covered-up its misappropriation:  PacifiCorp destroyed all emails
relating to Spring Canyon, “lost” Rand Thurgood’s notebook which described his work
during the critical period of time between Fall 2002 and Fall 2003, and its development team
leader emphasized “we need a very clear trail of how we arrived at the Mona site” when
(Spring 2003) PacifiCorp jettisoned its deal with Spring Canyon. (R4803, 4799-800)
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C. Summary Judgment on USA Power’s Claim for Breach of Contract Was
in Error Because USA Power Presented Evidence That PacifiCorp
Breached the Confidentiality Agreement.
The district court erred in concluding that USA Power “failed to present any evidence
that PacifiCorp used its confidential information” and, on that basis, granting summary
judgment on USA Power’s claim for breach of contract.  (R7611-12)  As an absolute
precondition to divulging any of its confidential information to PacifiCorp, USA Power
required PacifiCorp to sign the Confidentiality Agreement.  (R2082-86, 2106-07, 2621-24)
Under the Confidentiality Agreement, PacifiCorp agreed not to use or disclose USA Power’s
confidential information except solely for purposes of evaluating the potential sale of the
Spring Canyon project to PacifiCorp.  (R2621)
PacifiCorp breached that contractual obligation.  As described in subsection B above
regarding misappropriation, USA Power presented evidence from which a jury could
reasonably infer PacifiCorp used  USA Power’s confidential information to develop Currant
Creek.  Because that evidence was unquestionably sufficient to create an issue for trial, this
Court should reverse summary judgment on this claim.
III. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE GRANT OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
OF CONFIDENTIALITY BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT IGNORED
B O T H  D I R E C T  A N D  C I R C U M S T A N T IA L  E V ID E N C E  O F
WILLIAMS/HRO’S DISCLOSURE AND/OR USE OF USA POWER’S
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND ESTABLISHED AN ERRONEOUS
RULE OF LAW.
To establish its claim for Williams/HRO’s breach of the fiduciary duty of
confidentiality, USA Power must present evidence that Williams/HRO:  (1) obtained
confidential information during its representation of USA Power; and (2) used and/or
  Williams/HRO’s fiduciary duty of confidentiality to USA Power extends “to all61
information relating to the representation, whatever its source.”  Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.6
cmt. 3; Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 59 (2000).
  Although the district court did not clarify what “actual evidence” meant, the context of the62
court’s discussion indicates that “actual evidence” meant “direct” evidence.  (R7617-19) 
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disclosed that information without USA Power’s consent and for PacifiCorp’s benefit.  Shaw
Res. Ltd., L.L.C. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 2006 UT App 313, ¶ 29, 142 P.3d 560;
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 60(1)(a) (2000).
USA Power presented evidence that Williams/HRO obtained confidential information
during the approximately 2.5 years it represented USA Power with regard to all aspects of
its development of Spring Canyon, including the identity of viable sellers of water rights,
water options, and the price USA Power paid for Spring Canyon’s water rights.   The district61
court properly ruled that the issue of whether Williams/HRO obtained confidential
information was an issue of fact for the jury.  (R7617-18)
USA Power also presented evidence Williams/HRO disclosed to PacifiCorp and used
for PacifiCorp’s benefit USA Power’s confidential information without USA Power’s
consent.  The district court, however, erroneously granted Williams/HRO summary judgment
on the element of breach, ruling that USA Power failed to present “actual evidence” that
Williams/HRO disclosed or used USA Power’s confidential information.   (7618-19)  This62
Court should reverse that ruling because:  (a) USA Power presented actual, direct evidence
that Williams/HRO communicated USA Power’s confidential information to PacifiCorp and
used USA Power’s confidential information for PacifiCorp’s benefit, creating a triable issue
of fact; (b) USA Power presented actual, circumstantial evidence that Williams/HRO
communicated USA Power’s confidential information to PacifiCorp and used USA Power’s
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confidential information for PacifiCorp’s benefit, creating a triable issue of fact; and (c) the
district court applied an erroneous rule of law requiring a showing of “actual evidence” of
the disclosure and/or use of a client’s confidential information to survive summary judgment,
even where Williams/HRO simultaneously represented USA Power’s direct, adverse
competitor, PacifiCorp, for a single contract.
A. USA Power Presented Direct Evidence That Williams/HRO Disclosed And
Used USA Power’s Confidential Information 
USA Power presented direct evidence that Williams/HRO disclosed to PacifiCorp and
used for PacifiCorp’s benefit USA Power’s confidential information that Williams/HRO
obtained in the course of representing USA Power.  PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO’s
documents, as well as other evidence, demonstrated that, while Williams/HRO was
representing USA Power:  (1) Williams, in February 2003, disclosed to PacifiCorp the
confidential purchase price USA Power paid for its water rights, the identity of the narrow
pool of potential sellers of water rights for PacifiCorp’s competing power project, Currant
Creek, and the range of sale prices that Williams had obtained through the research and
negotiations she had done while representing USA Power (R2280-81, 2890, 7121-23, 7137,
8167 at 29-34); (2) Williams met, on PacifiCorp’s behalf, with the narrowed scope of water
right sellers to obtain water rights for Currant Creek  (R2740-41, 2744-45); (3) PacifiCorp
offered the exact same purchase price of $4,000 per acre foot for water rights for Current
Creek that USA Power had paid for water rights for Spring Canyon (R2280-81, 9770); and
(4) Williams assisted Rand Thurgood (PacifiCorp) in preparing a memorandum to obtain
PacifiCorp’s approval to purchase water for Currant Creek, which recited that the market
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price of water at that time was $4,000 - $4,500 per acre foot, the confidential amounts
Williams learned while representing USA Power.  (R2886-95, 8167 at 30).
That evidence is direct evidence of use and disclosure of USA Power’s confidential
information, and the district court’s ruling to the contrary should be reversed. 
B. The District Court Applied An Erroneous Rule Of Law Requiring An
Injured Client To Show Actual Evidence Of Disclosure and Use of Its
Confidential Information Even Where There Was Circumstantial Evidence
Of Use And Disclosure 
USA Power also presented circumstantial evidence of Williams/HRO’s use and
disclosure of USA Power’s confidential information that created a triable issue of fact.  The
district court wholly discounted that circumstantial evidence by misinterpreting Shaw Res.
Ltd., L.L.C. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C. 2006 UT App 313, ¶ 29, 142 P.3d 560, as
requiring more than circumstantial evidence.  The district court was wrong, and this Court
should clarify Utah law.  
The district court erred in interpreting Shaw to require “actual” evidence that did not
include circumstantial evidence.  In Shaw, the Utah Court of Appeals held that summary
judgment was appropriate on a claim by a client against a former attorney for breach of the
fiduciary duty of confidentiality because the plaintiff “failed to present non-speculative or
non-conjectural evidence” that the defendant attorneys obtained and had used or disclosed
the plaintiff’s confidential information.  Shaw, 2006 UT App 313 at ¶¶ 29-41.  Shaw did not,
however, hold that circumstantial evidence of use or disclosure could not defeat summary
judgment, and the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from this case.  
The Shaw court, in fact, recognized reasonable inferences of use of and/or disclosure
  In Shaw, moreover, the representation at issue was not simultaneous or substantially63
related, and plaintiffs had consented to the representation.  Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 44, 56.
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of confidential information can defeat summary judgment, provided they are supported by
the evidence.  Shaw, 2006 UT App 313 ¶¶ 32-33.  In stark contrast to this case, the Shaw
plaintiffs did not present relevant evidence from which such inferences could be drawn.
Rather, the plaintiffs did not include, as part of the record on appeal, a map which they
claimed contained the confidential information and produced only “sparse notations” and
invoices, none of which made any reference to the confidential information plaintiffs claimed
was obtained by the defendant attorneys.  Id. at ¶¶ 31-38.  The plaintiffs presented no
evidence whatsoever that could even arguably support an inference that the defendant
attorneys used or disclosed any of plaintiffs’ confidential information.  Id. at ¶¶ 30, 33, 39-
41.  Hence, the court found plaintiffs’ inferences of possession, use and disclosure were pure
speculation.  Id.  63
Here, the district court simply labeled all USA Power’s circumstantial evidence as
speculative and, thus, not “actual evidence” based on Shaw.  Shaw does not stand for the
proposition that all circumstantial evidence is speculative, conjectural or otherwise not
“actual evidence.”  Indeed, circumstantial evidence constitutes “actual” evidence sufficient
to establish issues of fact to withstand summary judgment under Shaw.  Circumstantial
evidence is evidence of “facts or circumstances from which the existence or nonexistence of
[a] fact in issue may be inferred.”  Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1293-94 (11th
Cir. 1999).  “In a civil case, circumstantial evidence is competent to prove a fact in issue, and
it is unnecessary that such proof rise to the degree of certainty to support only one conclusion
  Alfieri v. Alfieri, 733 P.2d 4, 10-11 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); accord Michalic v. Cleveland64
Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 330 (1960) (stating circumstantial evidence “may also be more
certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence”); Madison v. Deseret Livestock Co.,
574 F.2d 1027, 1036 (10th Cir. 1978); cf., Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) (“[I]nferences drawn from circumstantial evidence can be as probative as direct
evidence.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
  R2897-901, 2732-75, 2462-66, 2232-34, 4739, 4778, 3747, 3639, 2456, 3643, 714765
  R2000-05, 2126-27, 2140-41, 2571-75, 2818-64, 3190-95, 2913-17, 2921-39, 2941-62,66
2972-3039, 2967-70, 2988-90, 3041-42, 3116-20, 3341-50, 3748; 2232-34, 2462-63,
2534-35, 2544, 2577, 2580, 2732-816, 2866, 2868-71, 2878-79, 2886-95, 2913-20, R2 2911,
3044-47, 3055-59, 3643, 3859, 8167 at 30 & 81-82
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to the exclusion of all others.”64
Here, USA Power presented non-speculative circumstantial evidence from which a
reasonable juror could find that Williams/HRO used and/or disclosed USA Power’s
confidential information.  That evidence included:  (1) Williams/HRO simultaneously and
adversely represented PacifiCorp on a competing power project for a single contract;  (2)65
Williams/HRO was a member of USA Power’s development team and obtained substantial
confidential information about all aspects of Spring Canyon’s development, and then became
a member of PacifiCorp’s development team where all aspects of PacifiCorp’s competing
Currant Creek development were discussed and evaluated, including the critical need for
water for the competing project, the impact of wet versus dry cooling, the decision to use dry
cooling, the suitability of Mona as the site for the power plant, and the Spring Canyon project
which was a direct competitor for the same RFP slot;  (3) Williams/HRO acquired the66
critical component of water rights for PacifiCorp’s competing Currant Creek project in 20%
of the time that it took her to acquire the same volume of water rights for USA Power’s
Spring Canyon project, which enabled PacifiCorp to prepare and submit the winning bid and
construct Currant Creek (R2334, 3729-31, 3826-30, 5189-90; compare 5088X, with 2818,
  R1831-32, 2334-35, 2587-91, 2632-42, 3076, 3643, 4738-40, 4774-7667
  See Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996);68
Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.7, cmt. 1; see also Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 81 (3d Cir. 2006)
(noting attorney’s duty to client includes “undivided loyalty, candor, and provision of
material information”).
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3495); (4) Williams’ sworn testimony that she did not know whether she had disclosed
confidential information to PacifiCorp (R2543); (5) PacifiCorp hired Williams/HRO, without
ever considering any other water lawyer, (R4737-38, 2423-24), even knowing there was a
conflict of interest because the representation was adverse to USA Power and Williams/HRO
possessed USA Power’s confidential information that would be beneficial to PacifiCorp;67
and (6) Williams/HRO never informed USA Power that Williams/HRO was representing
PacifiCorp on its competing project or sought their consent (R2279-80, 2559, 3749, 5842).
This evidence regarding use and/or disclosure, must be viewed in light of the duty that
Williams/HRO assumed when they agreed to represent PacifiCorp with regard to the
competing Currant Creek project. In particular, when Williams/HRO began representing
PacifiCorp on Currant Creek, Williams/HRO assumed the duty of undivided loyalty to
PacifiCorp which, in turn, obligated Williams/HRO to use every fact of which they have
knowledge for the benefit of PacifiCorp.   In this case, where Williams/HRO was68
simultaneously and adversely representing PacifiCorp, Williams/HRO became ethically
obligated to disclose and use for the benefit of PacifiCorp any and all of USA Power’s
confidential information that could benefit PacifiCorp, even if it may violate
Williams/HRO’s duties to USA Power.  See id.
  This Court has not addressed the issue of whether a jury can infer the use and/or disclosure69
of confidential information solely from the fact there is simultaneous adverse representation.
That issue was not before the Court in Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107,
37 P.3d 1130.  There, the only issue before the Court was whether the district court erred in
finding that, as a matter of law, there was an attorney/client relationship at the time of the
events at issue.  Id. at ¶ 36.  In reversing and remanding the case, the Kilpatrick court, in
dicta, discussed whether there was evidence of use or disclosure when the only evidence
presented was that the plaintiffs, not the lawyers, had given the other client financial
information which the plaintiff then claimed was confidential.  Id. at ¶¶ 66-68.  The issue
also was not before the court in Shaw, where there was not simultaneous adverse
representation.  2006 UT App 313, ¶¶ 14-15.  Nor was the issue before the court in Gildea,
where the court simply ruled there was no attorney/client relationship between the plaintiff
and defendant.  Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265, 1270 (Utah 1998).
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C. The District Court Erred in Rejecting Persuasive Case Law  That Would
Permit a Jury to Infer Use and/or Disclosure of Confidential Information
Where the Lawyer Engages in Simultaneous Adverse Representation Such
As Occurred in this Case.
This Court should adopt a rule, similar to other jurisdictions, that simultaneous
representation by a lawyer of a client’s direct competitor alone gives rise to, at minimum, an
inference that may be drawn by the jury that the attorney shared the plaintiff’s confidential
information with its competitor.69
Jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have done so in the context of a former
client suing a lawyer for breach of the duty of confidentiality in representing an adverse party
on a substantially similar matter.  In those cases, the majority of jurisdictions have ruled that
evidence of the attorney’s representation of a former and current client on substantially
similar matters, alone, may, at minimum, allow a juror to draw the inference that “the client’s
confidences have been used against him in contravention of the attorney’s continuing duties
of confidentiality and loyalty.”  Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d 1013, 1031-32 (Wyo. 2002); see
Chrysler Corp. v. Carey, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1033-34 (E.D. Mo. 1998), aff’d, 186 F.3d 1016
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(8th Cir. 1999).
Those cases and the rationale behind that rule apply with even greater force here,
where the attorneys engaged in simultaneous adverse representation.   Just as in the
analogous cases, if the plaintiff cannot point to a particular item of confidential information
used or disclosed that should not prevent a jury from inferring disclosure or use.  Chrysler
Corp., 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34.  When an attorney engages in simultaneous adverse
representation, it may be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for one client “to discover
precisely whether and how the attorney has used his confidential information to the benefit
of [one client] and to the detriment of the [other].”  Bevan, 42 P.3d at 1031.  Moreover, the
privilege that attaches to the attorney’s relationship with the other client “may make it
exceedingly difficult for the former client to discover precisely whether and/or how the
attorney has used his confidential information . . . .”  Id.  Further, an inference of disclosure
is reasonable considering an attorney owes a duty to a new adverse client to use every fact
of which they have knowledge for that client’s benefit.  Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1290; Utah
R. Prof. Conduct 1.7, cmt. 1; see also Huber, 469 F.3d at 81.
Finally, requiring an actual showing of disclosure and/or use in simultaneous adverse
representation cases is bad public policy because it facilitates and encourages an attorney,
at any time, to cast off  her duties to a client in favor of a deeper pocket or bigger book of
business so long as the attorney and new client are able to keep evidence of disclosure from
surfacing.  As a matter of policy, this Court should not allow unethical attorneys to evade the
consequences of their behavior so long as a client is unable to pinpoint the exact, and often
undiscoverable, information that caused the client harm.  If not corrected by this Court, the
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rule applied by the district court will open the door for larger clients and deeper pockets to
easily cherry-pick the attorneys of their smaller, poorer adversaries mid-way through a
dispute or transaction, thereby gaining tremendous undue advantage and imposing on the
injured client an often unrecoverable disadvantage.  Laws creating such an opportunistic
loophole for a lawyer to escape all legal liability for wrongdoing will inevitably harm clients,
eliminate trust, and tarnish the reputation of the legal community.  
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON USA
POWER’S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF
LOYALTY DUE TO LACK OF CAUSATION BECAUSE USA POWER
PRESENTED EVIDENCE THAT WILLIAMS/HRO’S BREACH CAUSED USA
POWER TO LOSE THE SALE OF SPRING CANYON AND THE RFP.
 USA Power presented evidence that Williams/HRO breached their fiduciary duty of
loyalty by simultaneously and adversely representing PacifiCorp, and the district court
correctly ruled that the issue of breach must be decided by a jury.  (R7619-20)  The district
court, however, erroneously granted summary judgment to Williams/HRO, ruling, as a matter
of law, that USA Power could not establish the causation element of its claim for breach of
the fiduciary duty of loyalty.  (R7620-21)  The ruling on causation should be reversed.
In Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the court
set forth the legal standard for causation in a legal malpractice action based on breach of
fiduciary duty:  “But for defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty a reasonable likelihood existed
that the [plaintiffs] would have benefitted.”  Id. at 1291-92.  The court then went on to clarify
that causation is an issue of fact:
Generally, causation “cannot be resolved as a matter of law.”  “Proximate cause
is an issue of fact.  Thus, only if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable
jury could infer causation is summary judgment appropriate.”  
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. . . . 
In sum, “[b]ecause proximate cause is an issue of fact, we refuse to take it from
the jury if there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer
causation.”
Id. at 1292-93 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted).  That is the law in Utah.
In this case, USA Power presented evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer
causation, both with regard to the loss of the sale of Spring Canyon to PacifiCorp and with
regard to the loss of the RFP.  
USA Power presented multiple facts and inferences establishing that, but for
Williams/HRO’s breach of their duty of loyalty, a reasonable likelihood existed that
PacifiCorp would have purchased Spring Canyon for $3 million and a Joint Development
Agreement.  That causation evidence includes:  (1) prior to PacifiCorp hiring Williams/HRO,
PacifiCorp negotiated with and later reached an oral agreement with USA Power to buy the
Spring Canyon project for $3 million and a Joint Development Agreement (R2210-14, 2686,
3259, 4552-53, 4564-68); (2) prior to hiring Williams/HRO, PacifiCorp admitted Spring
Canyon was “the only project that has any possibility of meeting heavy load peaking hours
for a 2005 or even a 2006 commercial date,” and approved the purchase of Spring Canyon
for up to $3.5 million (R10394, 10397-98, 10400, 10403, 4813-18); (3) two weeks after
hiring Williams/HRO, PacifiCorp abruptly reneged on its agreement with USA Power, while
Williams actively pursued and then acquired water rights for PacifiCorp’s competing project
(R2732, 2216, 4565, 2686; see supra, SOF, Part VIII); (4) water was a critical component of
PacifiCorp’s Currant Creek project, and, prior to hiring Williams/HRO, PacifiCorp had not
undertaken any effort to acquire water rights (R6483 at n.7, 6484, 3639, 3072, 4736-39,
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4777-78, 5088X); (5) PacifiCorp never considered any other lawyer besides Williams/HRO
to acquire water rights for Currant Creek, despite the conflict created by Williams/HRO’s
representation of PacifiCorp (see supra SOF, Part VIII at 28-30), and charged Williams/HRO
with acquiring water rights for Currant Creek (R4778); (6) PacifiCorp’s lawyer gave
Thurgood advice about hiring Williams/HRO and terminating negotiations with USA Power
after PacifiCorp retained Williams/HRO (R2360-65, 6458-60); and (7) Williams/HRO used
and/or disclosed confidential information for PacifiCorp’s benefit in its development of
Currant Creek (see supra SOF VIII at 30-32).
USA Power also presented multiple facts and inferences establishing that, but for
Williams/HRO’s breach, a reasonable likelihood existed USA Power would have been
awarded the RFP contract.  That causation evidence includes:  (1) before PacifiCorp hired
Williams/HRO, PacifiCorp admitted Spring Canyon was “the only viable project site that
[was] capable of meeting a 2005 online date” and “[a]bsent the USA Power site, Generation
and C & T are unaware of other entities capable of meeting an April 2005 date” (R10398-
99); (2)  before PacifiCorp hired Williams/HRO, PacifiCorp admitted it was at least 2-3 years
behind USA Power in trying to develop a power plant in Mona (R2116); (3) to sufficiently
develop a power project such as Currant Creek in order to submit an RFP bid takes between
18 to 24 months to complete, and PacifiCorp only had 4 months to prepare a bid on a project
on which it had done no development work, including acquiring water rights (R3721-33,
5379-91); (4) Currant Creek could not be built or operated without water (see supra, SOF,
Part VIII at 29); (5) Panda had no water rights and no options to purchase water rights when
PacifiCorp acquired Panda (R7215-16, 3308, 5471, 4709, 4723-24); (6) PacifiCorp had done
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nothing to acquire water rights before it hired Williams/HRO (see supra, SOF, Parts VIII-
IX); (7) Williams was a member of USA Power’s development team, was involved in every
aspect of the development of Spring Canyon, and had confidential information regarding the
development of a power plant in Mona that would assist PacifiCorp in winning the RFP (see
supra, SOF, Part III); (8) Williams/HRO used and/or disclosed USA Power’s confidential
information to assist PacifiCorp in winning the RFP (see supra, SOF, Part VIII); (9)
Williams/HRO were successful in acquiring water rights for Currant Creek in 20% of the
time it took to acquire the water rights for USA Power and that shortened time frame was
essential for PacifiCorp to submit its bid, file an application for a CC&N, and to be awarded
a CC&N to construct Currant Creek (see supra, SOF, Part VIII at 31-32; R2588-91, 2783,
3076) ; (10) Williams devised the plan for PacifiCorp to acquire water rights for Currant
Creek and determined it was viable (R5839); (11) White and Wangsgard themselves
recognized that Williams “single handedly” secured PacifiCorp’s right to use water at Mona
and securing that right “would not have been possible without her” (R3067, 3065); (12)
PacifiCorp would not have won the RFP and been granted the CC&N to construct Currant
Creek without a firm water supply (R 3072, 3639, 3643, 4739-40, 6483 at n.7, 6484); (13)
only one 550 MW plant could be built in Mona (R 2328, 2866, 3643, 3723, 3787, 6448); (14)
only one power plant was selected in the RFP (R5088X-Y, 3326-28, 2275-76); and (15) USA
Power’s Spring Canyon bid placed second behind Currant Creek (R2 4265, 5842, 5847,
5337, 4695-96).
This Court should reject the district court’s reasoning that the possibility PacifiCorp
could have hired another lawyer to perform the work obtained from Williams/HRO defeats
  R 1994, 2000-05, 2113, 2140-41, 2818-64, 2907, 2913-15, 2921, 2972-3039, 3167-88,70
3190-95, 3857-67, 4554-55
  USA Power has been unable to find a single authority where such a rule has been accepted71
by an appellate court upon facts remotely similar to the instant case.
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a showing of causation because the breaching conduct was thus not “necessary” to USA
Power losing the bid.  (R7621)  First, that reasoning ignores the evidence that Williams/HRO
had unique skills and knowledge, including knowledge of potential water right sellers, their
selling price, and water right options, that they gained in the course of representing USA
Power.  By virtue of her work on USA Power’s behalf in Mona, Williams was the only water
attorney anywhere who was capable of providing the specific services to PacifiCorp in the
time frame required to win the RFP.  Williams/HRO were able to provide these services to
PacifiCorp much more quickly because, on USA Power’s dime, they had already spent the
time ferreting out potential water rights sellers, making contacts, building relationships,
learning pricing information, and becoming well-versed on acquiring water for a power plant
in Mona.   Again, as Wangsgard and White stated, Williams “saved the day” by “single70
handedly” securing PacifiCorp’s change application, which “would not have been possible
without her.”  (R3065-67)
Second, such reasoning defies logic and is bad public policy that this Court should not
endorse in its constitutional role of regulating the legal profession.   If the mere existence71
of other attorneys with the same general qualifications who might have been hired by a
client’s competitor defeats a showing of causation, as a matter of law, then virtually no
harmed client will ever again be able to maintain a civil claim for breach of the duty of
loyalty.  In almost all circumstances, a defendant lawyer will be able to point to other lawyers
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who might have provided the work that was performed for the client’s adversary.  Only in
those rarest of cases where a client can demonstrate the attorney in question has a skill or
specialty that is held only by that attorney, could a claim be maintained.  Such a rule would
effectively immunize  attorneys from being held liable for damages resulting from breaching
their duty of loyalty to an existing client.  Moreover, such a rule would actually encourage
attorney misconduct because it would inform attorneys they are free to discard an existing
client to represent an adversary of that client on the same matter when, as here, that adversary
happens to have more resources, and represents more potential profit.  This Court should not
ratify such a rule.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO’s favor and remand this case to the district court
for a trial on the merits of USA Power’s claims.
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_____________________________________
Peggy A. Tomsic
Eric K. Schnibbe
J. Ryan Connelly
136 East South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah  84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
81
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 12  day of November, 2008, two true and correct copies ofth
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS USA POWER, LLC, USA POWER PARTNERS, L.L.C., AND
SPRING CANYON ENERGY, LLC  together with the separately bound volumes of the
Continued Addendum were served via hand delivery to the following:
P. Bruce Badger
Fabian & Clendenin
215 South State Street, 12th Floor
P. O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah  84151
Thomas R. Karrenberg
Stephen P. Horvat
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah  84101
_________________________
ADDENDUM
Tab No. Description    Record Page
1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)
2. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(A) & (B)
3. Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2
4. Memorandum Decision, dated October 15, 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7599-7624
5. Order Granting PacifiCorp’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7625-7628
6. Order Granting Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP and
Jody L. Williams’ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment . . . . . 7629-7632
7. Hammerton, Inc. v. Heisterman, No. 2:06-CV-00806 TS,
2008 WL 2004327, at *10 (D. Utah May 9, 2008)
Due to the volume of the record materials pertaining to this appeal, this Brief’s
Addendum is continued in the separate Volumes I through IV, filed and served herewith.
